Henry Kissinger once described military men as “dumb, stupid animals to be used as pawns in foreign policy.” This was a less elegant rehashing of the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz’s famous dictum: “War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by different means.” Militaries, especially those of great powers, are expected to project their country’s power, intimidate its adversaries and competitors, and advance its national interests. Above all, when they present a formidable threat, armed forces allow politicians to negotiate better outcomes for their nations. Yet national armies were seldom passive entities. In many instances, they were agents of sociopolitical transformation, and every Arab knows this very well. In virtually all Arab republics, men from military backgrounds have risen to political power in the post-colonial era. Modern militaries, on the whole, do not engage in politics: This, of course, is the case for both the American and Russian armed forces. The Syrian conflict, however, has led to an interesting transformation in the roles they both play. Today, Russian and American officers find themselves involved in local politics as well as international diplomacy within the Syrian context. Before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, US military deployments in the Middle East served largely strategic purposes. In 1958, the Marines landed in Beirut to “contain” the Nasserist wave, while American deployments in the Gulf throughout the 1980s came as a response to upheavals in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A sizeable American force spearheaded the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, but the bulk of its deployment there was temporary. The US had tried to play the role of “peacekeeper” in Lebanon in 1982, and a decade later in Somalia, but both episodes ended terribly. With the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the US army became, for the first time since the Second World War, an occupying force in a foreign country. The American military found itself dealing with a complex society deeply rooted in history. It behaved, however, no differently from any other occupation force throughout history. The consequences for Iraq, its people and the wider region were disastrous. When the US intervention against Daesh in Syria began, the Obama administration, mindful of “Iraq syndrome,” made repeated assurances that there would not be any “boots on the ground.” Gradually, however, the US military deployed hundreds of troops to northeastern Syria to support its Kurdish ally, the YPG (and later the Syrian Democratic Forces). The US military presence in Syria serves strategic purposes that go beyond the fight against Daesh, including a significant local dimension. While the US had professed “nation-building” objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq, in Syria the official US stance is that there would be no attempts at propping up political structures. Nonetheless, US officers have become involved in local politics. To the Americans, their experience in Syria differs drastically from Iraq. To begin with, they have not faced any armed resistance, and they were not tasked with keeping order, leaving the job to their local allies — the SDF. But American officers have held public meetings with Kurdish political leaders from the self-proclaimed administration of northeastern Syria, and they have also conducted talks with tribal leaders in the area, all in front of cameras. Last week, American officers were pictured touring the markets of Manbij. But this open involvement in local politics has gone beyond objectives related to the anti-Daesh mission; when Turkey threatened the SDF-controlled city of Tel Abyad, American flags were flown to deter any possible aggression, while US patrols also protect the outskirts of Manbij from a Turkish incursion. The American military presence has effectively become an umbrella under which a political project is being constructed in northeastern Syria. In Syria, for example, Russian and US military officers are involved in local politics and international diplomacy. Fadi Esber For almost a decade, the quagmire in Afghanistan (1979-1989) bled the Soviet Union dry, before it eventually withdrew its forces after losing 15,000 soldiers. In Chechnya (a republic within the Russian Federation) in the 1990s, urban warfare against ethnically and religiously motivated fighters exhausted the post-Soviet Russian army. Syria, on the other hand, was a novel experience for the Russian military as it was its first deployment outside the countries of the former Soviet Union after the end of the Cold War. Soviet troops were frequently sent to Syria and other Arab counties throughout the Cold War, but merely as advisors and instructors to local armed forces. The Russian leadership, with “Afghanistan syndrome” on their minds, also declared that there would not be “boots on the ground” in Syria, with the bulk of the task taken up by the Russian Air Force. Soon, however, Russian troops appeared in Syria, taking on different roles, including political ones. Alongside military operations, Russian troops are waging a public relations campaign, distributing aid and setting up field hospitals. The Russian military is trying to present itself as a broker between Syrians instead of a party to the conflict and the main tool for achieving this objective is the “reconciliation center” operating out of the Russian air base in Latakia, where officers apparently negotiate local ceasefire deals and engage in talks with the leaders of armed opposition groups. Russian soldiers are also tasked with observing the “de-escalation zones” throughout Syria. More importantly, the center, which is run by Russian military personnel rather than diplomats, has been involved in local politics, hosting several meetings of the “internal opposition.” Apart from their local missions, both Russian and American officers have worked to maintain the de-escalation agreement in southern Syria and deconfliction along the Euphrates. Media reports have indicated that several meetings were held in recent months to maintain the status quo and prevent any incidents. Up until the American strike that killed several Russian private military contractors in February, there were no major incidents — even then, a wider conflagration did not occur. As political tensions between Russia and the US continue, these officers will have to increasingly work on preventing any incident from snowballing into an all-out conflict. Fadi Esber is a founding associate at the Damascus History Foundation, a private organization promoting research on themes related to the history of Damascus from the 19th century to the present. He is pursuing a doctorate in history at the London School of Economics.