Is the war in Syria over, as Russia and its sympathizers in the West claim, or are we heading for a second Syrian war with more participants as some analysts in the West suggest? The question is expected to be top of the agenda at a summit in Washington of US President Donald Trump and his French counterpart Emanuel Macron this week. The first leader invited by Trump for a full state visit, Macron wants the summit to be more than an occasion for cutting ribbons and toasts at banquets. According to sources in Paris, Macron has already scored one success with Trump by persuading him to take back his earlier pledge to withdrawn US forces from Syria. Trump accepted a delay because Macron said he had “new ideas” on Syria. To be sure, the delay was also encouraged by “strong advice” from several Arab allies, as well as Trump’s Defense Secretary James Mattis and the new National Security Adviser John Bolton. The French analysis is that the first phase of the Syrian war, aimed at altering the status quo that existed in 2011, has already ended with success. In that status quo, Syria was a highly centralized state in the iron grips of a tight dictatorship backed by a coalition of minorities. Seven years later, that dictatorship is no longer as tight as before if only because it has lost credible control over more than 70 percent of the Syrian territory and more than half the population. Shortage of loyal manpower, and lack of adequate financial and administrative resources, means that regime head Bashar al-Assad is no longer able to set the tune anywhere outside his enclave in Damascus. Elsewhere, Syria has been transformed into a hodgepodge of no-man’s land and chunks of territory controlled by Russia, Iran and its mercenaries, Turkey, the Kurds, Sunni Arab rebels, the United States and its NATO allies, and, more recently, even Iraq. Though not directly present in Syria, Israel, too, has tried to mark out its “security zone” there by bombing any presence it deems a potential threat. Thus, the second Syrian war, in its opening phases at least, will be about the consolidation of the new status quo. The 2015 boast by Russian President Vladimir Putin that his forces were engaged in protecting the “Syrian regime and Syrian integrity” is gone for good. But also gone for good is the dream of anti-Assad rebels to drive the despot out or kill him, and then ride into Damascus on a white charger to lord over a unified Syria. What Macron proposes is “the management of the possible,” which implies the tactical relinquishment of the ideal by all sides. In that context, Russia has already offered a “sharing-out” plan under which all powers involved in the Syrian conflict secure a portion of the poisoned cake, euphemistically labeled the “de-escalation zones.” Russia no longer wants to exclude others as long as others don’t try to deny its portion of Syria. “We cannot make any predictions about the preservation of Syria’s territorial integrity,” says Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Rybakov. “We don’t even know how to solve this crisis or whether the possibility exists of keeping Syria as a unified nation.” The US has echoed that sentiment in an oblique way by announcing a plan to help ethnic Kurds set up “local authority” in portions of Syria they control. What sounds like a Russo-American consensus on the possibility of carving up Syria has caused some concern in Tehran where the leadership is increasing unhappy about its marginalization by Moscow. The growing pessimism in Tehran with regard to Syria is reflected in an analysis published Saturday by news site Tabnak, run by former chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Gen. Mohsen Rezai. “There are signs pointing to a disintegration of Syria,” it says. What matters for Russia and the US is to “coordinate their moves” and prevent “violent clashes of conflicting interests.” A similar analysis is offered by General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff under President Barack Obama. He suggests a test of “probability and consequences. For example, he says, the probability of another terrorist attack on the US or its Western allies is high, but is consequences would be manageable. On the other hand the probability of a clash between the West and Russia is low, but its consequences could be beyond management. What matters in Syria is to consolidate what amounts to a cold war situation on a miniature scale. A mini-version of the Iron Curtain could do the trick in Syria by making sure there is no clash with Russia, secure in its portion of “useful Syria” and the Western powers and their allies roaming elsewhere in Syrian territory. However, Macron has argued that for the new status quo to be stabilized, the Western powers need a stronger footprint in Syria. That idea is supported by some powerful voices within the Trump administration, but opposed by some leading supporters of the president in the media, Congress and Republican Party. To address the concerns of his base, Trump is probing the possibility of enlisting the support of Arab allies. According to Washington sources, some like Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Kuwait have already been contacted. Work on building a number of operational bases in Syria, to be protected by local Kurdish militias, is also underway. Once the US and NATO, Arab and local Syrian Kurdish and Sunni Arab allies have created a credible military footprint and established a modus vivendi with Russia in Syria, the new phase of the war could begin in earnest in political, diplomatic, information and economic fields. One move already on the drawing board consists of reviving the international Investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Syria by Assad and his allies. The investigation was initially launched by the US Department of State in 2013, but was shut down and its budget canceled by President Obama. Trump’s new Secretary of State-designate Mike Pompeo, however, favors reviving it as part of a campaign to win the moral argument against Russia and its protégé Assad. In Washington this week, Macron hopes to heighten his profile as the leader who promoted a “Syrian solution” acceptable to both the US and Russia. What we may be heading for, however, is a “lukewarm” second Syrian war, the outcome of which could affect the entire region.