One of the major takeaways from the litany of recent developments on the global stage is that we have all begrudgingly learned how to collectively hold our breath as we are led through uncharted waters by a hard-charging administration in Washington. It can seem unorthodox, and even unpalatable, in a world more used to polite diplomacy but if it can break a decades-long deadlock, the end might justify the means. Unfortunately, when it comes to the highly-touted second Trump-Kim Summit, which abruptly concluded last week without any agreement, the “end” carries different meanings. For decades, there has been a consistent and aggressive exchange between an isolated, blockaded, sanctions-riddled North Korea and a near planet-wide coalition of interests, led by the United States. No matter who occupied the White House, US policy on North Korea has always been to contain the nuclear-armed rogue state, cripple it with sanctions and then dangle the carrot of relief in exchange for Pyongyang abandoning its nuclear ambitions. In other words, an American version of denuclearization that forces North Korea to give up its powerful ace with little guarantee of similar concessions from Washington. For obvious reasons, this has consistently proved to be a non-starter. North Korea has always demanded three things to trigger substantial moves toward denuclearization. Firstly, the lifting of the US blockade and sanctions. Secondly, replacing the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty that guarantees North Korea would not be subject to invasion or any form of aggression (even when blessed by the peace-keeping seal of the United Nations, like what happened in 1950). Thirdly, the US would also need to withdraw its five-brigade military presence in South Korea, not only as a guarantee of US/South Korean non-aggression but as a necessary step toward unifying the Korean Peninsula. This clash of wills and the extreme level of disparity, cemented by escalating rhetoric and increasingly daring missile-launch testing, have become characteristic of this standoff. Meanwhile South Koreans and, to some extent, the Japanese bear the brunt of the showdown between a seemingly stubborn Washington far removed from any threats versus a belligerent Pyongyang all too confident in the potency of its 60-80 nuclear missiles. South Korea’s attempts to seek deeper economic ties with its northern neighbor through inter-Korean economic projects face significant obstacles as a result of Washington’s punishing sanctions. South Korean President Moon Jae-in has advised US counterpart Donald Trump to use these joint economic projects as additional incentives to court Pyongyang and secure a deal. Regardless of the motivations, seeking a lasting peace and a denuclearized North Korea are in the best interests of those who stand to face the worst repercussions should “fire and fury” replace awkward friendship and camaraderie. Hafed Al-Ghwell Japan, Washington’s largest bulwark in the Far East, shares the same ideals of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. However, there is growing concern in Tokyo that Trump, desperate for a deal, might accede too quickly to an arrangement that only targets North Korea"s long-range ballistic missiles (which pose a threat to mainland US) while leaving its short-range capabilities (which pose a threat to Japan) intact. Meanwhile, China’s chief concern has always been keeping North Korea as stable as possible. Beijing remains far more wary of the treat of armed conflict than of Pyongyang stockpiling nuclear missiles, given the inevitable deluge of refugees that would stream across its border fleeing violence. However, if Washington’s about-face leads to sanctions relief and normalized relations, all the better for Chinese interests. Trump initially adopted an aggressive stance against Pyongyang, much like his predecessors, but increased nuclear testing from a seemingly unstoppable, uncontainable North Korea warranted a different approach. Instead of stubborn demands, Washington opted for conciliatory overtures, ranging from oversize letters to amending previously set red lines, such as unilaterally halting the joint US-South Korea military exercises that have long irked Pyongyang. Eventually, two summits, the first in Singapore last year and the second in Hanoi, Vietnam, last week were arranged in an attempt to hash out common ground and mark the start of a painstaking denuclearization process. Critics suggest that in the mind of adversarial, authoritarian Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un, the US capitulation to Pyongyang’s demands is a type of victory. For a regime starved by isolation, blockade and sanctions, America’s seemingly conciliatory approach and signs of a budding bromance between Trump and Kim earns it unwarranted legitimacy and recognition. In a way, North Korea’s aggression and threats succeeded in forcing a meeting of equals. This hamstrings any future conversations about denuclearization and Korean unification, even if the US resumes its aggressive stance. There is also the possibility that Beijing might agree to pressure Pyongyang in exchange for Washington looking the other way when it makes a play for Taiwan, another US bulwark and staunch ally in the region. Nonetheless, such efforts to reach an agreement with North Korea should be welcomed, and wishing for Trump to fail would be in poor taste. Regardless of the motivations, seeking a lasting peace and a denuclearized North Korea are in the best interests of those who stand to face the worst repercussions should “fire and fury” replace awkward friendship and camaraderie. As one commentator noted, even a crack in this seemingly immovable door could be the start of a long process toward achieving the impossible. Unfortunately, the Hanoi summit, which ended with no deal in place, did not turn out be the stage that might have elevated Trump to a Hall of Fame occupied by former US presidents who achieved the seemingly impossible. Most of the world is breathing easy again because the US did not give up a lot in exchange for a little or vague promises. Hopefully, where there have been two high-level summits there could be a third and a fourth, and so on until a breakthrough can be reached. It remains to be seen whether Washington"s “new” policy on North Korea will endure but maybe, just maybe, it is what is needed to deliver the impossible: a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. • Hafed Al-Ghwell is a non-resident senior fellow with the Foreign Policy Institute at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He is also senior adviser at the international economic consultancy Maxwell Stamp and at the geopolitical risk advisory firm Oxford Analytica, a member of the Strategic Advisory Solutions International Group in Washington DC and a former adviser to the board of the World Bank Group. Twitter: @HafedAlGhwell