An explosion in an oil tanker, ignited by a grenade, last week killed about 40 people and injured nearly 50 in the Turkish-controlled border town of Afrin in northern Syria. Turkish officials blamed Kurdish militia the People’s Protection Units (YPG) for the carnage. A day earlier, Israeli aircraft mounted an attack in Syria at the Mezzeh military airport outside Damascus. Defense Minister Naftali Bennett said the assault, the latest of several hundred in the past nine years, signified the Israeli resolve to “push (Iran) out” of Syria. Daesh fighters, too, have initiated attacks on government and Kurdish forces in desert areas in the east of the country. On April 9, they attacked regime forces with heavy machine guns, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. These attacks were quelled by Russian air assaults The recent incidents took place as various parts of Syria confronted a virulent new threat: The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. On March 23, the government introduced quarantine measures and set up isolation wards for those who become infected, while the public has been advised to take precautions to protect themselves. By the end of April, 40 confirmed cases of infection and three deaths were reported in government-controlled areas. The Kurdish northeast reported its first suspected COVID-19 death at the end of March, but it took nearly three weeks for a laboratory in Damascus to confirm the cause. In the northwestern areas surrounding Aleppo, where opposing government, Kurdish and Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) forces are located side-by-side, it is difficult to isolate communities or provide the necessary medical support. In an attempt to limit the spread of the virus, the FSA has closed routes into regime and Kurdish-controlled areas. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan plans to unite all pro-Turkish forces into one army. Talmiz Ahmad The principal area of concern is Idlib. This town of 3 million people is dominated by radical group Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS). Here, Turkish and Syrian government forces, the latter supported by Russian aircraft and Iran-backed militants, are confronting each other. The fighting has displaced nearly a million people, who now live in crowded camps. According to a report by humanitarian organization Refugees International, 80 hospitals have been destroyed by fighting and there is an acute shortage of medical personnel and equipment. It is feared a virus outbreak could erupt at any time. Turkey remains at the heart of the Idlib conflict. Following its March 5 agreement with Russia, which created a 6-kilometer safe zone in southern Idlib on either side of the M4 highway that stretches from Aleppo to Latakia, Turkey has moved about 22,000 troops to the area. They are deployed at 56 posts and bunkers along the road. However, despite the agreement with Russia, it has taken no action against extremist elements in Idlib. According to recent reports, Turkey, which controls two rebel outfits — the FSA and the National Liberation Front (NLF) — has plans to dominate all of northern Syria, including Kurdish territories beyond the Euphrates, where the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces are located. To achieve this objective, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan plans to unite all pro-Turkish forces into one army, bringing together the FSA, the NLF and the extremist HTS. This unified force will enable Erdogan to eliminate the Kurds’ “Rojava” (homeland) in northern Syria once and for all, and also give Turkey the firepower it needs to retain control of the northern territories against Bashar Assad’s forces. Erdogan’s plans face two obstacles, however. Firstly, the militants in Idlib are divided among themselves and show no enthusiasm for the prospect of joining the Turkish force. The HTS, which was previously the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Nusra Front, reinvented itself in 2017 by shedding its ties with Al-Qaeda and repositioning itself as a mainstream Islamist party. It is now estranged from its erstwhile extremist partners in Hurras Al-Din and other similar groups, which retain their links to Al-Qaeda. The HTS is also divided internally; some of its members distrust Turkey and are not in favor of joining the proposed unified force. The other problem for Erdogan is Russia, as Moscow would like to see a hammer blow directed at the militants in Idlib. It also opposes Turkey’s plans for a permanent occupation of northern Syria and, with Iran, is pushing for a united and sovereign Syrian nation under Assad. These obstacles have produced Erdogan’s usual brinkmanship. Taking advantage of the pandemic, he has decided to postpone the final deployment of Turkey’s new Russian-made S-400 missile defense system. This is clearly a gambit by the president in an attempt to keep open diplomatic channels with the US that would otherwise be shut down if the system was fully deployed. Erdogan perhaps believes that Turkey’s interests in Syria are more likely to be backed by the US, particularly given his close personal ties with President Donald Trump. This perception is encouraging him to move away from his recent partnership with Russia and Iran, and perhaps end the Astana peace process. Given the serious opposition to his plans from militants and Russia, Erdogan’s vision of long-term Turkish control over northern Syria is likely to be a pipe dream. But it could cause some bitter fighting around Idlib and also involve the Kurds, all while the pandemic wreaks havoc among the fighters and the population at large. The outlook for Syria remains very grim. Talmiz Ahmad is an author and former Indian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE. He holds the Ram Sathe Chair for International Studies at the Symbiosis International University in Pune, India.