Considering what we have already experienced in 2020, it seems almost too painful to raise a worry about nuclear weapons, but it is pertinent to do so. This week, senior officials from the US and Russia are meeting in Vienna — that old-world home of arms negotiations — to work on a series of interconnected security issues, from space to nuclear warheads. We should all hope that something positive emerges from their discussions. The background to the talks is the impending expiry, in February 2021, of the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction) treaty. Signed in 2010, it is now strikingly — following the US’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and Open Skies Treaty — the last remaining legally binding agreement limiting the holders of the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals. It is a vital piece of world order architecture, supporting arguably one of the world’s most improbable success stories of the last 50 years: That of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation. From its origins in the early 1960s, when President John F. Kennedy, among others, predicted perhaps 20 nations would soon possess the power to destroy mankind, the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed in 1970 has helped limit that weaponry to perhaps just nine states, give or take public acknowledgement in some cases. The nuclear arsenals, which could still wipe out humanity, have been reduced to a fifth of what they were. The bargain — for non-weapons states to have access to peaceful nuclear energy in return for nuclear weapon states working to reduce and ultimately eliminate their stockpiles — has endured despite all the various conflicts the world has thrown up. The bargain has not been an easy one: The temptations to proceed covertly or demand access to nuclear weapons more openly are well-known throughout the Middle East and North Africa. There is little argument against the view that nothing would be improved if non-proliferation failed and that the risks of war and conflict would increase, as would the possibility of non-state actors benefiting from a looser arrangement. As the US and Russia own more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, it is essential — and actually an obligation under Article 6 of the NPT — that they uphold their side of the deal and continue their work to reduce and limit their weaponry. New START does just that; ending it would not. It caps the weaponry of both sides, and the extensive verification processes ensure there is a level of predictability and certainty between parties, the absence of which could be catastrophic, as the “near misses” of the past demonstrated. In the world’s swirling and swollen river of growing distrust and confrontation, it is not a bad branch on which to cling. There is an option to extend the treaty for five more years simply by agreement of the parties. Russia has already expressed a willingness to do so, dropping earlier preconditions. The US position has been different. It has so far been unwilling to agree to an extension as it has concerns about the development of Russian weapons outside the scope of the treaty, while it would also like to see China drawn into a trilateral agreement. While, as always, it is worth talking about these ideas, the practical politics are likely to make such aims impossible. Russia has made some concessions on particular weapons systems, though not all, but any serious negotiation of such a treaty would take significant time, as all those with experience of arms control talks are aware. And China, hardly well-disposed to the US at present to say the least, and with perhaps a tenth of the arsenal of the others, is simply not going to be pulled into such a lopsided negotiation. The US position appears to be an offer asking to be refused, especially if it is also unwilling to bring the UK and France on board. To lose New START — because the US wishes enhancement of it — defeats the objective of the treaty at a critical time. Alistair Burt Such is the belief of many, and pressure is building. NATO allies have joined a growing chorus of voices in the US, including from the top of the military establishment, to argue that to lose New START — because the US wishes enhancement of it — defeats the objective of the treaty at a critical time. Given the breadth of the agenda between the US and Russia this week, it is clear that a New START extension does not preclude negotiations to come on the future possibilities. In short, both sides wish for a better replacement, but that will take time. International treaties and protocols matter. They are often born out of tragedy, yet hope, and in recent years they have been weakened or pulled asunder, on all sides, by a generation with no lived experience of their origins and an inability to relate historical memory to new situations. Those throughout the Middle East and North Africa, who have suffered enough, should be urging both Russia and the US to stop holding New START hostage and extend it to further deconflict tensions in an uncertain, post-2020 world. Alistair Burt is a former UK Member of Parliament who has twice held ministerial positions in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office — as Parliamentary Under Secretary of State from 2010 to 2013 and as Minister of State for the Middle East from 2017 to 2019. Twitter: @AlistairBurtUK Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News" point-of-view