The first “virtual” convention of the Democratic half of the US political duopoly was a flashy, star-studded showcase of the party"s vision for the challenging years ahead should Joe Biden win the presidential election in November. Speakers prescribed a much-needed course correction at home, given how a poor public health response to the global pandemic went horribly awry. With millions out of work, school closures, strained healthcare facilities and intensifying anxieties about the “new normal,” concrete ideas for dealing with these crises are likely to resonate with the electorate. For the rest of the world, however, it was the events of the second day that were of more interest, as speakers and montages played up the former vice president’s foreign affairs experience, not just as a member of the Obama administration, but as chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee. Unfortunately, the rules of politics demand only hints about what a President Biden’s international agenda will look like, instead of concrete policy goals. The broad message was that Biden had the experience, competence and gall to navigate a global stage teetering on the precipice and unclear of what lies at the bottom of the ravine. What we do know is that the unipolarity of old is giving way to a muddled geopolitical mess of multilateralism, regionalization and strong-arm interventionism. It is impossible to turn back to a time when Foggy Bottom and the White House led the world order and it would be far too risky for America to suddenly vanish altogether. Fortunately, even the seven paragraphs dedicated to the Middle East in the 2020 Democratic platform make it abundantly clear that the US will not abandon the region— even if the fuss and alarmism now appear to say otherwise. Indeed, planned troop reductions in Afghanistan and Iraq are a little concerning, but with US defense spending rising it is perhaps another sign of a changing world, where the number of boots on the ground is no longer a credible gauge of America’s commitment. Both parties are eager to turn a page on large-scale military interventions abroad and getting bogged down in endless wars, necessitating a return to a Middle East policy model that centers on allies and partners. Thus, under a Biden administration is likely to eschew violent conflict, and even the threat of it, in favor of pragmatic, non-ideological diplomacy, which deters with economic might, soft power and balanced relationships. Despite the inevitable criticism for not radically departing from establishment foreign policy (which the Trump administration tried, and failed), the Middle East must prepare for a “leading from behind” foreign policy on steroids. In other words, a Biden administration will avoid re-engaging in Iraq and Syria, while urging allies bogged down in Libya and Yemen to commit to negotiated settlements. In matters that may still require a show of force, such as deterring Russian encroachment or Tehran’s wayward adventurism, a coalition of Gulf states, Israel and Egypt will gradually shoulder more of Washington’s military obligations, with US “advisers” in the shadows. The recent accord between the UAE and Israel is almost providential, intensely favorable to a Biden-style multipolar foreign policy vision. US policy theory in the region has been reliant on cordiality between Israel and Washington’s Arab allies, despite the reality being vastly different. Hafed Al-Ghwell The treaty is a massive step in Washington’s long game to make Iran, not Israel, the driving force behind the realignment and unifying of disparate interests in the region. As much as the Trump administration may seek to tout this development as a major accomplishment, the treaty is a culmination of a patient strategy to isolate Tehran and cement its pariah status for events between 1979 and 1981. US policy theory in the region has been reliant on cordiality between Israel and Washington’s Arab allies, despite the reality being vastly different. However, with other Arab states likely to follow Egypt, Jordan and the UAE in normalizing relations with Israel, Washington is closer to its ideal framework for fostering regional security and stability, and safeguarding shared interests. Additionally, annexations in the West Bank will probably be halted indefinitely and deepening ties may require Israel to shelve those plans altogether. It also saves from the impossible dilemma of expressing solidarity with the plight of the Palestinians while giving carte blanche to Benjamin Netanyahu. Iran should be wary of this real, practical avenue aimed squarely at curbing its activities without firing a single shot. Biden is keen on drawing Tehran back to a revived, possibly updated Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that will require playing diplomatic hardball. After all, it is highly unlikely his 2,000 foreign policy advisers will urge a U-turn back to the 2015 agreement. What is needed now is something more iron clad, expanded to include ending Tehran’s interventionism in Yemen, Syria and Iraq as a prerequisite for its return to the global economy. Iran will also have its own demands, banking on Russia or China’s veto powers as leverage, but refusal to engage will be far more costly. Moscow has little in common with Tehran save for the latter being a wrench in Washington’s designs for the region. Beijing is far more inclined to support stabilizing mechanisms than risking entanglements that could result in sanctions or costly delays in its regional Belt and Road Initiative. Russia could be easily convinced to scale back its ambitions if its plans for warm water Mediterranean ports are not at risk in Syria and Libya. In addition, should Tehran reject efforts at a negotiated settlement, it risks becoming yet another geopolitical battleground, rendering its revolutionary claims of sovereignty moot. There are a lot of upsides to prudent multilateralism, both for antagonists and allies; Biden’s extensive experience and the depth of wisdom in his ranks of policy advisers could be the lynchpin in shaping a new Middle East. The Trump administration’s isolationism and penchant for bilateral arrangements certainly has some appeal to those exhausted by regional entanglements. However, the results speak for themselves, and in November it will be up to American voters to approve a permanent shift away from the interventions of old and reactionary isolationism in the Middle East toward “pragmatic diplomacy” centered on cooperation and shared interests. Hafed Al-Ghwell is a non-resident senior fellow with the Foreign Policy Institute at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He is also senior adviser at the international economic consultancy Maxwell Stamp and at the geopolitical risk advisory firm Oxford Analytica, a member of the Strategic Advisory Solutions International Group in Washington DC and a former adviser to the board of the World Bank Group. Twitter: @HafedAlGhwell Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News" point-of-view