Lebanon should have known happier anniversaries. It was in the relative hope that things would continue in a positive direction that the centenary year of the State of Greater Lebanon began. Plans for commemoration kept multiplying and, despite worrying signs, the Lebanese were hoping that their country would step into its second century of existence the same way it had entered the first: Against all odds and despite the storms. But harsh reality decided otherwise. Like a visitor to the bedside of a person in agony, French President Emmanuel Macron has traveled to Lebanon, a country for which France had, 100 years ago, harbored many hopes. On the occasion of a visit that is laden with symbolism and political risks, Macron brings for the Lebanese, in addition to salve for the open wound of the Beirut blast, reasons to reflect on the century gone by so that they learn some of its lessons. Many countries sometimes develop from great tumult and painful convulsions. The lesson that the Lebanese must learn is that certain evils may arise from good, so much so that a nation-state can “disappear” (to quote French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian) as a result of the tumult that we are experiencing at the moment, both in the region and the world. Incidentally, the fateful date of Sept. 1, 1920, also capped a long sequence of incredibly turbulent, violent and tragic events for large parts of the post-war world, specifically for the Ottoman Empire, European empires and the Levant, as the French and British chancelleries called it at the time. The 1918-20 period had been one of intense diplomatic activity, if one takes into account the Paris Peace Conference, the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations and other agreements that gave birth to a slew of new countries. At the center of this whirligig was the articulation of a vision and the expression of a Lebanese will by an assortment of “Libanists” led by Patriarch Elias Pierre Hoyek. Macron brings for the Lebanese reasons to reflect on the century gone by so that they learn some of its lessons. Joseph Bahout The Libanists knew how to unpack the geo-economic interests of the great powers (the Franco-British duo, but also the industrial and cultural-religious lobbies of Lyon and Marseille), and how to position themselves in relation to these interests, in order to give birth to a country whose existence was by no means a given. The second lesson for the Lebanese is: If certain conditions are needed for the birth of a country, then a will and a purpose are also necessary to achieve that goal. These are the qualities the Lebanese must acquire today in order to extend their country’s 100-year-long existence and project it into the future. The entity born in 1920 came to the world tired and bled dry. It had been drained by the massive famine of 1916-17; hurt by the great emigration to Latin America, Africa and Egypt; set back by the rejection of Greater Lebanon by a part of the population affiliated to Mount Lebanon; and threatened by the Arab refusal symbolized by the 1920 Battle of Maysalun as well as Syrian irredentism, which never really ceased. However, it was relatively quickly that the founding fathers came up with a message, which was the only means to overcome these congenital weaknesses. It was at once a message, a function and a vision for Lebanon: As a space for dialogue and coexistence of cultures and beliefs, a bridge between East and West, and a commercial and liberal republic, all founded in a combination of historical narratives and legends that had hitherto often diverged. Which brings us to the third lesson. What can allow the Lebanese people to overcome old wounds and determine their destiny are assimilation and integration of the past as harmoniously as possible into a narrative with a nationwide appeal, to associate with it, and to include as many people as possible in it. As a corollary lesson, the founding narratives alone are not sufficient to make a national community viable. Such narratives must be coupled with a real function, that is, a geopolitical and economic raison d’etre. This is what is at present sorely lacking in Lebanon and its people, and this is what they need, at all costs, to reinvent. Greater Lebanon, at least between 1920 and the 1970s, was a resounding success story, although ill winds too often threatened it to the point of shaking its foundations. The decades-long passage was possible largely because of the relative political genius of its elites: Pragmatic by interest, tending to compromise by “trade,” sometimes too much even. But all in all, they were keen to preserve this common space of prosperity and openness within a region that had already lost these attributes. The fourth lesson pertains to what is required today of Lebanon’s elites — not only the existing ones, the very ones who have tried and failed, but also the new ones, who must necessarily take the reins from their elders. It is up to them to emerge on their own, to prove their credibility, and to provide for the next 100 years the momentum for carrying on the project of a Lebanon in constant construction and perpetual change. Joseph Bahout is director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, where he is also an associate professor of political science. He has long been a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington DC, a professor at Sciences-Po Paris, and a consultant to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Twitter: @jobahout Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News" point-of-view