he only trade deal that Boris Johnson can agree with the European Union is a flimsy one. It will be a rickety bridge to the continent, much looser than the old one but still tethered in ways that Brexit ideologues hate. That doesn’t mean the prime minister won’t sign. He has a record of doing substandard deals and pretending they are great. Tory hardliners have a record of going along with the charade. But first there is the obligatory period of pretending that no bridge is required; that the future is accessed by leaps of faith. The talks are at an impasse. The European side complains that Britain is unrealistic. The UK warns that Brussels underestimates Johnson’s readiness to walk away from the table. That is still the preferred option for a faction of ardent Europhobe Tories, but they cannot be sure of the prime minister’s nerve. This time last year, nearing the cliff’s edge, he scrambled down to the withdrawal agreement. Now there is the additional factor of economic debilitation by the coronavirus. Johnson’s macho readiness to inflict gratuitous pain on his country does not weigh on EU minds as much as British negotiators seem to think it should. Continental leaders would prefer to avoid the disruption of no-deal for their own sakes, but they know the cost is higher for Britain. They were not impressed by the threat in 2019 and are bored by this year’s sequel. Tory complaints that Brussels isn’t paying enough attention to their sabre-rattling are proof that Johnson’s sabre isn’t quite as big as he makes out. The main obstacle to a deal is UK rejection of any obligation to shadow regulatory standards set in Brussels. Brexiteers see that as a stain on national sovereignty, which is true, but dilution of sovereignty is the price that the smaller party in a negotiation pays for access to the market of the bigger one. That is how trade deals work. When it comes to a US deal, Washington will not be any more deferential than Brussels has been to the Brexit cult of immaculate regulatory autonomy, and some US demands – on food standards, for example – will be less palatable to British consumers. The EU is immovable on this point because the threat of undercutting comes from a close neighbour. Some Tories hanker for a bonfire of labour protections and environmental standards, but that is not Downing Street’s main reason for rejecting “level playing field” provisions. The fear is that Brussels will thwart UK plans to subsidise its way to competitive advantage in fledgling sectors of the economy. The vision, theorised by Dominic Cummings, is of a hyper-adaptable British state, crucible of a new industrial revolution in artificial intelligence, genomics and hi-tech wizardry yet to be invented. There might be advantages in that field from turning a cold shoulder to the EU, although the case can also be made that Britain’s tech pioneers benefit from European markets. Even with a deal, the hard Brexit model gains a theoretical head-start for industries of the future by sacrificing industries of the present. Fanatics of the Cummings revolution are relaxed about that (it isn’t their jobs on the line), but Johnson has a different cost-benefit equation to run. The gains from a no-deal Brexit are remote at best. The pain is immediate. The prime minister might try to camouflage the economic disruption as pandemic fallout, but some problems will not be easily rebranded. Covid-19 doesn’t cut cross-Channel supply chains. There might be some mileage in blaming a blockade by beastly continentals, but that won’t erase memories of Johnson claiming a deal would be an “oven-ready” doddle. Failure to make the foreign oven work is still failure. Downing Street also worries that a disorderly Brexit will stoke Scottish nationalism in the run-up to Holyrood elections in May. An orderly one wouldn’t much diminish the demand for independence, but having the European question settled would take some of the sting out of Nicola Sturgeon’s rhetoric on the subject. Getting a deal allows Johnson to boast once again that he is a keeper of promises and a defier of remoaner miserabilists. EU leaders will play along, talking up the sacrifices they have made. Their own domestic audiences are uninterested, so it costs them nothing to help the UK prime minister sell a deal back home. The number of Tory MPs who would understand the small print and care if it sullies Eurosceptic ideals is small. Most will dutifully pass on the Downing Street line that Boris has played a blinder. Johnson’s only principle is self-satisfaction, and on that basis the political calculus should bring him to compromise in Brussels. That doesn’t mean he will get to that conclusion. People close to the process say he has not yet engaged with the equation. He will get conflicting counsel. The chancellor’s view on the matter is vital and mysterious. Businesses will agitate for certainty. Rishi Sunak will not want to spoil the reputation he has built during the pandemic as a level-headed pragmatist. But nor will he want his Tory colleagues to think he has caught a nasty remainer bug in the Treasury. If he intends to steer the prime minister towards a softer Brexit landing, he will do it late and discreetly. And even if the prime minister is persuaded that a deal, any deal, is what he needs, he could bungle the choreography, overplay the flouncing theatrics. EU patience is not infinite and time is running out. It is easy to map the path on which Britain stumbles into a winter of economic discontent, with Tories pounding a nationalist drum to distract an angry public. But that is not Johnson’s first choice. The flimsy treaty brandished in triumph, the rickety bridge – there lies the attractive path to a lazy man who cares above all about tomorrow’s headlines and the optics of success. That doesn’t guarantee there will be a deal. But if there isn’t one, it will be an accident of inattention, not the fruition of some cunning plan. • Rafael Behr is a Guardian columnist