Dec. 8 came and went last week as if it was an ordinary day. For Palestinian political groups, however, it was another anniversary to be commemorated. It was on that date 33 years ago that the First Intifada (uprising) broke out, and there was nothing ordinary about this historic event. Today, the uprising is merely seen from a historical point of view; another opportunity to reflect and perhaps learn from a seemingly distant past. Whatever political context the intifada had, it has seemingly evaporated over time. The simple explanation of the intifada goes as follows: Ordinary Palestinians were at that time fed up with the status quo. They wished to shake off Israel’s military occupation and make their voices heard. Expectedly, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) quickly moved in to harvest the fruit of the people’s sacrifices and translate them into tangible political gains, as if the traditional Palestinian leadership truly and democratically represented the will of the people. The outcome was a disaster, as the intifada was merely used to resurrect the careers of some “leaders,” who claimed to be mandated by the Palestinians to speak on their behalf, resulting in the Madrid Conference of 1991, the Oslo Accords, and all the other “compromises” ever since. But there is more to the story. Thousands of Palestinians, mostly youths, were killed by the Israeli army during the seven years of the intifada, as Israel treated non-violent protesters and rock-throwing children, who were demanding their freedom, as enemy combatants. It was during these horrific years that terms such as “shoot to kill,” “broken bones policies” and many more military stratagems were introduced to an already violent discourse. In truth, however, the intifada was not a mandate for Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas or any other Palestinian official or faction to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people. And it was certainly not a people’s call on their leadership to offer unreciprocated political compromises. To understand the meaning of the intifada and its current relevance, it has to be viewed as an active political event, constantly generating new meanings, as opposed to a historical event of little relevance to today’s realities. Historically, the Palestinian people have struggled with the issue of political representation. As early as the mid-20th century, various regimes claimed to speak on behalf of the Palestinian people — thus using Palestine as an item on their own domestic and foreign policy agendas. The use and misuse of Palestine as an item in some imagined collective Arab agenda came to a relative end after the humiliating defeat of several Arab armies in the 1967 war, known in Arabic as the “Naksa” (letdown). The crisis of legitimacy was meant to be quickly resolved as the largest Palestinian political party, Fatah, took over the leadership of the PLO. The latter was then recognized as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” during the Arab League summit in Rabat in 1974. The above statement alone was meant to be the formula that resolved the crisis of representation, therefore drowning out all other claims made by Arab governments. That strategy did work, but not for long. Despite Arafat and Fatah’s hegemony over the PLO, it did enjoy a degree of legitimacy among Palestinians. At that time, Palestine was part of a global national liberation movement and Arab governments, despite the deep wounds of war, were forced to accommodate the aspirations of the Arab people, keeping Palestine as the focal issue among the masses. However, in the 1980s, things began changing rapidly. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 resulted in the forced exile of tens of thousands of Palestinian fighters, along with the leaderships of all Palestinian groups, leading to several massacres of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The years that followed accentuated two grave realities. First, the Palestinian leadership shifted its focus from armed struggle to merely remaining relevant as a political actor. After relocating to Tunis, Arafat, Abbas and others were issuing many statements, sending all kinds of signals that they were ready to “compromise” — as per the American definition of this term. Second, the Arab governments moved on, as the growing marginalization of the Palestinian leadership lessened the pressure of the Arab masses for a united front against Israeli military occupation and colonialism in Palestine. It was at this precise moment in history that the Palestinians rose up. It was a spontaneous movement that, in the beginning, involved none of the traditional Palestinian leadership, Arab regimes or any of the familiar slogans. I was a teenager in a Gaza refugee camp when all of this took place — a true popular revolution being fashioned in its most organic and pure form. The intifada saw the use of slingshots to counter Israeli military helicopters; the use of blankets to disable the chains of Israeli army tanks; the use of raw onions to assuage the pain of inhaling tear gas; and, most importantly, the creation of language to respond to every violent strategy employed by the Israeli army and to articulate the resistance of Palestinians on the ground in simple yet profound slogans, written on the decaying walls of every Palestinian refugee camp, town or city. While the intifada did not attack the traditional leadership openly, it was clear Palestinians were seeking alternatives. Ramzy Baroud While the intifada did not attack the traditional leadership openly, it was clear that Palestinians were seeking alternative leadership. Grassroots local leadership swiftly sprang out of every neighborhood, university and even prison, and no amount of Israeli violence was able to thwart the natural formation of this leadership. Alas, years of relentless Israeli violence, coupled with the lack of a political strategy, sheer exhaustion, growing factionalism and extreme poverty brought the intifada to an end. Since then, even the achievements of the intifada have been tarnished, as the exiled Palestinian leadership used them to revive itself politically and financially, eventually reaching the point of arguing that the dismal Oslo Accords and the futile peace process were direct “achievements” of the intifada. But the true accomplishment of the intifada was the fact that it allowed the Palestinian people to demonstrate their own capacity to challenge Israel without having their own military, to counteract the Palestinian leadership by organically generating their own leaders, and to confront the Arabs and, in fact, the whole world regarding their moral and legal responsibilities toward Palestine and the Palestinian people. Ramzy Baroud is a journalist and the Editor of The Palestine Chronicle. He is the author of five books. His latest is “These Chains Will Be Broken: Palestinian Stories of Struggle and Defiance in Israeli Prisons” (Clarity Press, Atlanta). Twitter: @RamzyBaroud Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News" point-of-view