A common frustration of commuters across the world is lengthy waits only to find that two trains or buses arrive at once. This is a predicament that the EU can relate to in the last week of December, with a brace of key trade and investment deals finally agreed after years of difficult negotiations. It is the politics, rather than the economics, of the two agreements that is the more fascinating. The Christmas Eve UK-EU trade deal was, of course, widely anticipated and ultimately secured once UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson decided it was too risky (even for his high-wire style of politics) not to agree a post-Brexit trade deal with the EU in the middle of a once-in-a-century pandemic. Much more of a surprise was the timing on Dec. 30 of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), which will give European and Chinese companies better access to each other’s market. That deal, discussed since 2014, suddenly developed new momentum around Christmas, despite the wider chill in relations since pandemic; only a few weeks ago the EU urged a joint initiative with the US to “address the strategic challenge from China’s growing international assertiveness.” Late December is a peculiar time in the diplomatic calendar for such an unscheduled breakthrough, with no negotiating deadline to force the issue as there was with Brexit. Much of the sudden urgency to move CAI forward reflects Beijing’s desire to get it over the line before Joe Biden’s inauguration as US president. China’s calculation here is at least twofold. First, it is acutely aware that the incoming Biden team has concerns about CAI. One of the president-elect’s worries is that some Chinese companies may now gain a stronger foothold in Europe by using Uighur Muslim forced labor for their products. The EU is conscious of these US concerns too and Poland suggested delaying action on CAI until after consulting the Biden team in late January. However, most EU states chose instead to take advantage of the political window of opportunity that has unexpectedly opened up with Beijing. A second reason for Chinese proactivity on CAI is that Europe is becoming an increasingly important foreign policy theater for Beijing. The rising power generally enjoys growing influence across much of the continent from Eastern and Central Europe, where it regularly holds “17+1” summits, to key Western European states such as Italy, which last year became the first G7 country to endorse the Belt and Road Initiative. Much of the sudden urgency to move CAI forward reflects Beijing’s desire to get it over the line before Joe Biden’s inauguration as US president. Andrew Hammond The EU-China breakthrough raises the question of whether there may now be a significant warming in ties in 2021 after the chilliness of recent months. While CAI will do much to improve the atmospherics in diplomacy between Brussels and Beijing, it is significantly less likely to promote a fundamental positive reset in relations in coming months for at least three reasons. First, there are many issues clouding the agenda, in the short term at least. These include the opaque way that Beijing is perceived by Europe to have handled the Wuhan coronavirus outbreak; the new Chinese security law in Hong Kong; Uighur human rights; and growing pressure on European leaders not to allow Huawei technology in their 5G networks. Second, the Biden team will now increase efforts with the EU to try to agree a more aligned transatlantic approach toward China. On Dec. 22, for instance, incoming US national security adviser Jake Sullivan said the Biden-Harris administration “would welcome early consultations with our European partners on our common concerns about China’s economic practices.” Third, some Brussels policymakers remain concerned, despite CAI, about whether China’s external interventions in Europe represent a “divide and rule” strategy to undermine the continent’s collective interests. EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell even asserted last year that Beijing was a “systemic rival that seeks to promote an alternative model of governance” to that of Europe. Rather than a fundamental reset in relations, CAI is most likely to mean that the EU will maintain constructive engagement with China, more aligned with the US under Biden’s presidency than has been the case under Donald Trump. There will be diplomatic differences, but an emphasis on areas of perceived common interest, from tackling climate change to promoting an open financial and multilateral trading order. Brussels asserts that CAI will help move toward that latter goal of an increasingly transparent economic system. So, despite post-pandemic tensions, both Brussels and Beijing recognise that they still have much to gain from their partnership. The EU sees CAI as part of this long-term approach, and the decision to push forward with it largely reflects China’s calculation that the window for sealing the deal may not remain open indefinitely, especially given the impending Biden presidency, which may do much to rejuvenate the Atlantic alliance post-Trump. Andrew Hammond is an Associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News" point-of-view