As the Vienna talks progress, the consensus view is that a new Iran nuclear deal is inevitable, even if the details remain debatable. It is clear that concerns shared by America’s partners in the Gulf are unlikely to materially influence the discussions. The Biden administration has received repeated warnings about the perils and short-sightedness of simply returning to the terms of the original 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) without dealing decisively with Iran’s other destabilizing activities, such as its ballistic missile program and support for regional proxy militias. Unfortunately, getting Iran to agree to any deal targeting its non-nuclear activities, let alone the rest of the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US, plus Germany), will be next to impossible, and trying to do so endangers the primary goal of ensuring nuclear non-proliferation in the wider Middle East. In a climate of intensifying geopolitical rivalry, it is exceedingly rare for the P5+1 to be united behind Iran and the US returning to compliance with the JCPOA, rejecting calls for a more comprehensive deal. It is therefore unsurprising to see the White House reach for this low-hanging fruit, even with Iran’s regional saber-rattling and refusal to cooperate with the UN’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Washington’s impatient lunge for a deal has already sidelined the concerns and interests of its regional partners who bear the brunt of Iran’s destabilization agenda. It is similar to how the original JCPOA paved the way for Iran to stockpile fissile material to unprecedented levels, and service its long-term goal of acquiring and mass-producing offensive nuclear weapons. If Tehran had no plans for non-military applications, saddling its strained national budget and sanctions-riddled economy with the expense of enrichment beyond the 3.75 percent limit would make little sense. Yet these programs have persisted even under maximum sanctions, resulting in Iran enriching fissile material up to 20 percent — far more than it needs for commercial purposes, and enhancing its expertise in nuclear enrichment with a new line of advanced centrifuges. Simply returning to an inherently unstable JCPOA will not reverse or bury Iran’s advancements in enrichment, nor will it guarantee maximum compliance, especially in terms of transparency. Instead, a repeat of the post-JCPOA stockpiling of fissile material is likely, either in anticipation of the deal’s expiry in 2030 (unless it is extended), or its evolution into a covert arms control duel in which the US and its allies work to prevent Iran continuously seeking to reduce its nuclear breakout time. Experts estimate that Iran can acquire sufficient fissile material to develop at least one nuclear device in three months to a year from now. Tehran"s long-term post-JCPOA plans to obtain offensive nuclear capabilities remain intact while rejecting any attempts to rein in its regional destabilization plans. Hafed Al-Ghwell In addition, Tehran has a notorious knack for exploiting loopholes in existing frameworks by, for instance, carrying out part of its enrichment programs on military bases, which are off-limits to IAEA investigators. Iran has repeatedly justified flouting the limits imposed by the JCPOA, arguing that Washington’s unilateral withdrawal and subsequent sanctions invalidated the agreement. Thus, negotiators will have to ensure the re-negotiated JCPOA will be prescient enough to curb abuses and enforce compliance to levels acceptable to both its signatories, as well as the rest of the region. Ultimately, if a reworked JCPOA focused on curbs to Iran’s nuclear program is a foregone conclusion, then the only option left for America’s regional allies is to pressure Washington on a follow-up deal to address Iran’s non-nuclear threats Iran. The geopolitical and regional landscape has shifted since the JCPOA was signed, and Iran’s most troubling threats now are not just the pursuit of a nuclear weapon. On the military side, ballistic missiles and drones have advanced in their range, sophistication and accuracy, enhancing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ conventional strike capabilities. Politically, its involvement in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen has granted Tehran unprecedented levels of local influence, and deeply entrenched proxies who are nearly impossible to dislodge. Furthermore, expanded ties to Russia and China have not only granted Iran an economic lifeline, but have also resulted in arms transfers that will boost its military capabilities and those of its regional proxies. Additionally, new alignments have reshaped the Middle East and North Africa’s dynamics and military balance. Where the original JCPOA green-lit Iran’s nuclear research and development, a renegotiated deal could persuade other Arab states to acquire similar capabilities as a deterrent to future aggression and to maintain the existing tenuous balance. In other words, negotiating a follow-on agreement would stabilize the new JCPOA by placing stringent clauses to discourage reneging on the deal, while also limiting the range of Iran’s ballistic missiles and ratcheting up regional tensions via proxies. However, such limitations would have to go both ways, and with Washington eyeing an exit from the region to focus more on China in the Indo-Pacific, enforcing these additional terms will prove challenging. Another troubling development comes from Iran’s electoral body disqualifying reformists and moderates from participating in next month’s presidential election. This spells a troubling future in which hard-liners dominate the government, ensuring Tehran"s long-term post-JCPOA plans to obtain offensive nuclear capabilities remain intact while rejecting any attempts to rein in its regional destabilization plans. Regardless, there must still be concerted efforts to seek a more comprehensive follow-on agreement, which Tehran can be induced to participate in as a precursor to lifting the remaining non-nuclear sanctions even after a settlement is reached on a re-worked JCPOA. The primary objective of such a deal would be to assuage regional concerns, as well as gain US Congressional support for sanctions relief by addressing Iran’s rapidly advancing ballistic missile program, and regional destabilization activities. Without it, the US risks repeating the same mistakes of the past, endangering its partners in the region and its overall interest in a stable, secure, and non-nuclear Middle East. • Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow with the Foreign Policy Institute at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Twitter: @HafedAlGhwell Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News" point-of-view