There was a sense of inevitability about the collapse of Israel’s coalition government. The cynics would argue that the very fact that this implausible coalition survived a year is nothing short of a miracle. On the other hand it could be equally argued that a rare opportunity to restore desperately needed stable, unified and orderly governance has been missed. The decision by the Knesset to dissolve itself has thrown the country into another prolonged, damaging and vitriolic election campaign that will conclude when Israelis head to the polling stations on Nov. 1 for the fifth time in three and half years. This is a sad reflection of both the deepening divisions in Israeli society and the paralysis of its political system. Between now and polling day there will be plenty of time for some educated speculation about who will be the winners and losers when the die is cast. But the safest bet is that the results will be as inconclusive as those of the four previous elections, and that the new government’s majority will be a very slim on— or that yet another election will follow soon after. Much of what is about to happen over the next few months derives from what went miserably wrong for the current government. It would be simplistic to argue that this coalition was stillborn since it comprised parties with diametrically opposite ideologies, so it was just a matter of time until the cracks would show and eventually bring about its collapse. After all, what can cement a government that among its members includes both those who believe that the route to resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict dictates a two-state solution and those who believe that the entire territory between the Jordan River and Mediterranean Sea should be ruled by the Jewish state? What glue can hold together secular liberals, Orthodox Jews and Arab Islamists in order to coherently lead a rather complex society? And how could pure free-marketeers work with the center-left and the socialdemocrats to provide a consistent socio-economic agenda? These conundrums meant from the outset that the life expectancy of this government was bound to be short, and that at best it would be an interim government, a mere exit ramp from the long and destructive Netanyahu era, one that would stabilize a shaky political system until Likud’s leader vacates the political scene for good. Despite fashioning itself as a “change government,” this administration, with its unusual arrangement of being led by a prime minister, Naftali Bennett, and an alternate prime minister, Yair Lapid, was chiefly motivated by a pressing need to replace the longest serving prime minister in Israel’s history, Benjamin Netanyahu, and stop that defendant in three cases of corruption from holding the highest office in the country. But because Netanyahu’s Likud party is the largest faction in the Knesset and there are strong elements within the current coalition that ideologically identify themselves more with the opposition parties than with some of their colleagues in coalition, this opened the door for accusations, baseless as they were, that they had betrayed their supporters. It was inevitable that some would buckle under the pressure and abandon the coalition, instead of seeing the value of an inclusive government that would bring an end to the divisive and corrupt era of Netanyahu and his supporters.Yet short-lived though this government has been, its formation in the first place demonstrated the hollowness of Netanyahu’s demagogic claim that there could be no leader but himself. The coalition, however, has not endured long enough to completely remove the danger of his return to power. If not for its longevity, at least the Bennett-Lapid government might still be remembered for trying to restore some sanity to the political process, not to mention some standards of behavior and collegiality, particularly between its two main protagonists. In complete contrast to Netanyahu’s broken promises in past rotation agreements, Bennett, for all his shortcomings, stood by his agreement with Lapid and handed over the role of prime minister in an orderly manner. It may be obvious to the vast majority of us that agreements should respected, but in a political landscape that for years has been shaped by Netanyahu’s unchecked lust for power, such respect has become a rare commodity. It is too soon to know how this coalition will be judged by history, but the fact that for the first time an Arab-Israeli party, and an Islamist one, was part of it and that its leader, Mansour Abbas, proved to be one of its most responsible members by working tirelessly to keep it together despite severe criticism from Palestinians — whether Israeli citizens or those in the occupied and blockaded territories — must remain a lasting legacy of including the Israeli-Palestinian minority as an equal partner in government. Moreover, this government passed a budget bill, and thus ended the irresponsible and corrupt tampering with the budget by previous Netanyahu administrations. Furthermore, the ability of politicians with diametrically opposed views to constructively attend to some of the domestic and international challenges Israel is facing, especially while under constant and abusive attacks from the right-wing bloc, should not be taken for granted. However, Bennett and his partners in government failed to properly manage the coalition and protect some of its more vulnerable members from the vile verbal attacks and threats to their well-being that caused them eventually to relent and withdraw their support. It was also hardly a government of change when it came to the Palestinian issue, to the point that it was impossible to tell the difference between it and those led by Netanyahu: under it, the settlements have continued to expand, the treatment of Jerusalem as belonging exclusively to Jews continues, and the blockade on Gaza was eased only marginally. We will never know how this government would have evolved had it lasted for a full term. Still, both in its policies and its spectacular collapse, it has demonstrated that whether in power or in opposition it is the populist right, and gradually the religious ultra-right, that are calling the shots in Israeli politics. • Yossi Mekelberg is professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. He is a regular contributor to the international written and electronic media. Twitter: @YMekelberg