There is talk of a possible rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran with the prospect of the revival of the nuclear deal, but rapprochement is too strong a word. The Gulf states in general and Saudi Arabia in particular have currently irreconcilable differences with Iran. But while Israel has gone on a killing spree of Iranian nuclear scientists, Saudi Arabia has decided to deescalate and engage. Despite its disapproval of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action because it does not address the issue of Iranian ballistic missiles and regional proxies, Saudi Arabia is not an aggressive state and is preoccupied with its economic and social transformation — hence its decision to engage instead of escalate. Though the general mood is to agree to disagree, Saudi Arabia and Iran can also work actively on promoting stability in the region. The sweet spot for this engagement is Lebanon. Hezbollah is the main power in Lebanon and holds the key to any solution. Of course, an armed Hezbollah is unacceptable to Saudi Arabia. It is the flagship Iranian proxy emulated by other pro-Iran groups. Hezbollah also trains groups that pose a direct threat to Saudi Arabia, such as the Houthis in Yemen. Nevertheless, some kind of accommodation on Lebanon can be agreed with Tehran. Lebanon is heading toward presidential elections, which by law must take place before the end of October. However, experts expect a presidential void that will add to the current deadlock. Hezbollah has done this before; it forced a stalemate from 2014 to 2016 to secure the election of its own candidate, Michel Aoun. This time both camps will use their right of veto to prevent the candidate from the other camp from claiming the presidency. Meanwhile Lebanon has only a caretaker government, because the political elite cannotagree on ministerial appointments — so in two months it will have no prime minister, no cabinet, and no president. This void will accelerate a social and economic meltdown that Iran and Hezbollah definitely do not want. Even if the nuclear deal is revived, with sanctions lifted and funds released, Iran will not be able to feed twomillion Shiites in Lebanon. Hezbollah supporters are suffering along with everyone else. Hezbollah and Iran understand very well that Lebanon needs a productive economy. They also understand that if their candidate becomes president and the government has the stigma of being Hezbollah led, then Lebanon would beisolated from the Arab and international community. Here Hezbollah faces a dilemma. They cannot afford the isolation of Lebanon, and if the country collapses it will collapse on their own head. On the other hand, they cannot relinquish control of the government for security reasons. To understand the importance of arms to Hezbollah, it is necessary to understand the value of proxies to the regime in Tehran. Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib Before the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, Hezbollah was not part of the government and its role was solely one of “national resistance.” It had no need to participate in government because it was protected by the Assad regime’s presence in Lebanon; it knew that no elected Lebanese government would try to disarm it because the Syrian regime would not allow it. That protection was lost when Syrian troops pulled out of Lebanon two months after Hariri’s assassination, and Hezbollah needed to have control of the government to ensure that it could not be forced to disarm. When the pro-Hariri, anti-Hezbollah camp gained a majority in the 2005 parliamentarian election and formed a government, the group responded with sit-ins and protests in Beirut. The pressure culminated in Hezbollahtaking the capital by force in May 2008, which led to the Doha Agreement and the creation of a national unity government in which Hezbollah held a “ blocking third” of 10 ministerial posts, giving them an effective veto on decisions. To understand the importance of arms to Hezbollah, it is necessary to understand the value of proxies to the regime in Tehran. Iran has been under sanctions for four decades and has been denied a modern arsenal since the time of the Shah, while its enemies have been armed to the teeth with the latest American technology. Iran started looking at creative means of deterrence, which is where the proxies come in; they can make any attack on Iran very costly. For example, if Israel ever decides to attack Iran, they know that Hezbollah is next door and can wreak havoc. That is why Iran views the protection of Hezbollah’s arsenal as a national security matter. However, the arrangement whereby Hezbollah shares power in Lebanon with other parties in order to protect its weapons no longer works; a power-sharing government will lead to more paralysis and inefficiency, and a Hezbollah-controlled government will lead to isolation. Lebanon needs a functional and coherent government to introduce comprehensive reforms, and it needs international and Arab support to jumpstart the economy. An agreement to achieve that could mean giving Hezbollah a guarantee on its weapons — an assurancethat the new government will not attempt to disarm it — in return for the group allowing the election of a neutral president and the formation of a government of technocrats focused on reform. Such anarrangement would enable Lebanon to avoid a collapse and bring about economic recovery, while giving Iran and Hezbollah the guarantees they need. In a nutshell, Lebanon is a good theater in which to test potential Saudi-Iranian cooperation, that hopefully would expand to include agreements all over the region. Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib is a specialist in US-Arab relations with a focus on lobbying. She is co-founder of the Research Center for Cooperation and Peace Building, a Lebanese NGO focused on Track II.