Since 2020, states in the Middle East have chosen to make radical changes to their foreign policy orientations due to both structural and domestic reasons. While years-long hostilities were put aside and a new page in relations opened between previous foes, the Ukraine war, which erupted in February, once again altered the balances from Europe to the Middle East. Scholars argue that foreign policy changes occur when decision-makers adjust their priorities in making new reorientations. In this regard, Jakob Gustavsson argues that change occurs when a leader’s foreign policy vision is confronted with new stimuli. Turkey’s foreign policy shifts of recent years could be an excellent case study to show how domestic pressures shape foreign policy decisions. Turkey has recently entered into a normalization path with the Gulf countries, Egypt, Israel and Armenia in order to change the balances in its own favor. Besides these countries, there have been statements made by Turkish officials that indicate a possible thaw might also occur with Syria. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently said a meeting with his Syrian counterpart was not on the agenda, but it is also not impossible. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has declared that Ankara has no preconditions for dialogue with Syria, but that any talks should focus on security on their shared border. Although this constitutes a softening of Ankara’s stance toward Damascus after a decade of hostility, Turkey also brings to the table a possible military operation in Syria if a security threat is posed. Turkey has conducted four military operations in Syria since 2016 and another new offensive would, once again, require a green light from Russia, which is preoccupied with Ukraine rather than Syria. Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in Astana on Thursday on the sidelines of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia summit. This was the fourth meeting between the two leaders in less than three months. They also met in Samarkand in September within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, in Sochi in August following a grain agreement with Ukraine, and in July in Tehran during the trilateral summit on Syria with Iran. Since the beginning of the Ukraine war, Erdogan has been the only NATO leader to meet Putin frequently, which is significant at a time when Russia is internationally isolated. Given its geopolitical advantage, Turkey aims to pursue a balancing act, while it also rolls up its sleeves to play the mediator role between Ukraine and Russia and, in a broader perspective, between the West and the Kremlin. Syrian refugees remain the second-most discussed topic — after the crisis-ridden economy — that pressures the Turkish government. Sinem Cengiz One interesting example of this balancing act was that the day before Erdogan’s meeting with Putin this week, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar was at the NATO headquarters in Brussels for talks. The main motivation for Turkey’s balancing act is to keep contact with Russia on Syria, energy and trade issues, while also coming out from the Ukraine crisis as a mediator. This would increase its prestige both at home and abroad ahead of next year’s parliamentary and presidential elections. Despite the good working relationship between Erdogan and Putin, Russia and Turkey have many points of friction. As a NATO member, Ankara has found itself in the opposite camp to Moscow in various conflicts, including Libya, Azerbaijan and Syria. Even in the Ukrainian war, while it sold drones to the Ukrainian forces fighting against Russians, it refrained from joining the sanctions on Russia. In addition, while Turkey aims to bring Putin together with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the former would prefer to discuss the issue with US President Joe Biden. This is another difference of view Ankara and Moscow have in the Ukrainian war. They also have differences in priority. While Russia’s focus is on Ukraine, Ankara is pressured with the Syria file. While Turkey gives signals of possible normalization with Damascus, it also keeps the military operation option on the table. Russia is against the idea of military action; instead, it has been demanding Ankara cooperate with Damascus. However, Russia’s international isolation over the Ukraine war may lead to it giving a green light for an operation. Thus, it is significant to note a statement that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made in June: “We understand fully the concerns of our friends over the threats created on their borders by outside forces that are fueling separatist sentiment.” Ankara’s main goal is to neutralize the YPG, the Syrian wing of the Kurdish terrorist group the PKK, and ultimately send Syrian refugees back to their home country. Syrian refugees remain the second-most discussed topic — after the crisis-ridden economy — that pressures the Turkish government. Opposition parties, which also reject a new military operation, have been employing the refugee issue ahead of the elections. They have been using the refugee file to pressure the government, demanding that they be returned home in coordination with Damascus. On the domestic level, Turkey’s policy toward Syria — whether engaging in dialogue or conducting a military operation — will be closely indexed to its domestic politics, where societal polarization increases every day. On the international level, any decision on Syria will depend on Russia’s position and what the frequent Erdogan-Putin meetings produce for Ankara.