Negotiations between Israel and Hamas over a ceasefire, the release of hostages and allowing more humanitarian aid to enter the Gaza Strip have been taking place mainly in Cairo, and for a reason. To begin with, the Qatari negotiators have become increasingly frustrated and disillusioned with both sides, to the extent that a senior Qatari official, Majed Al-Ansari, told an Israeli newspaper that his country has decided to re-evaluate its role. Secondly, Egypt has its own interest in brokering an agreement between Hamas and Israel, as it would avert a threatened Israeli ground offensive in Rafah that would almost certainly result in many thousands of Palestinian refugees, and probably many Hamas militants, crossing the border into Egypt in search of a safe haven. Of all the possible scenarios, this is the one Egypt dreads most, both for its humanitarian implications and because of the links between the Gazan Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt. In one sentence, Al-Ansari summed up the general feeling about the negotiations between Israel Hamas when he suggested that neither side is convinced an agreement is in their best interest, and said: “Every time we get close to a deal there’s sabotage, from both sides.” This suggests neither side trusts the other, with good reason, and so resorts to maintaining the current unresolved situation, or at least views it as the lesser evil. It is an approach that is shocking to the rest of us. To be sure, one needs to distinguish between what the leaderships of these two sworn enemies see as being in their best interest and what would actually be beneficial for their people. A temporary ceasefire that brings about the release of the hostages, increased humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip, and the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails could create fresh momentum for the longer and more permanent ceasefire that is urgently needed. However, it would also increase the pressure on both leaderships to justify the fact that they have inflicted this physical, psychological and political calamity on their own peoples. In Israel, anti-government protests, which understandably were suspended after the Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas, are once again gathering momentum, and many among the protesters are the families and friends of hostages. Not all of the current protesters were necessarily supporters of the demonstrations last year that focused on preventing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government from weakening Israeli democracy through its attempts to compromise and reduce the powers of the judiciary. Rather, they are united by a strong sense of betrayal, firstly by the government’s colossal failure to defend the country and its people on Oct. 7, and secondly for its inability to bring the hostages home after more than 200 days. Netanyahu knows that when the war is over, the demands for him to go will increase exponentially Yossi Mekelberg There is a strong sense among very many Israelis that in recent months there have been enough opportunities to reach an agreement over the release of the hostages but that Netanyahu, for his own reasons and personal interests, is employing delaying tactics to prolong the war as his only hope of clinging to power, thereby derailing such opportunities. He knows that when the war is over, the demands for him to go will increase exponentially and there will be no escape from the immediate establishment of a state commission to investigate the war from day one, an inquiry that in all probability will strongly question his suitability to remain in office. Moreover, some of his even more extreme, warmongering colleagues in government, who still believe that destroying Hamas is an achievable objective, are threatening to quit the coalition if the army does not enter Rafah. By all accounts, such an incursion would be bound to result in even more mass killings of Palestinians, end the chance of any of the hostages being released alive, and lead to the further displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, in some cases for at least the third or fourth time since the war began. In addition, because of the proximity of Rafah to the border, it would put pressure on Egyptian authorities to allow civilians caught in the crossfire to enter the country, creating further tensions between Israel and the first Arab country to sign a peace agreement with it. A certain degree of brinkmanship in negotiations is understandable but in this particular case one has to question the will on either side to reach an agreement at all, unless the other capitulates. For Israel, the main achievement from a successful conclusion to the negotiations would be the release of the hostages — but there are strong elements within the Israeli government for whom this is not a priority. On the Hamas side, although the most recent offer tabled was described by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and British Foreign Secretary David Cameron as “extraordinarily generous,” in terms of the release of Palestinian prisoners and more humanitarian aid being allowed into the Gaza Strip, their main concern is an end to the war and this is not on offer. One does not have to feel any sympathy for Hamas and its leadership to understand the logic behind their demand for an end to the war. As cruel as their mind games with the hostages and their families might be, this is currently the group’s main asset in their negotiations with Israel; the more they release, the more vulnerable they become, with no guarantee that an Israeli offensive on Rafah will not take place. In fact, in a Cabinet meeting this week, Netanyahu promised a military incursion into Rafah “with or without” a hostage deal. This can only be interpreted as the prime minister caving in to the most extreme elements within his coalition. One such minister declared this week that the release of a few dozen hostages would not justify failure to “complete” the war’s objectives. Under these conditions it seems the leaderships of both sides are more interested in deliberate procrastination to sabotage any hopes of an agreement. In the absence of sufficient political will on the parts of Israeli authorities and Hamas to reach an agreement, it is left for the mediators to use whatever leverage they can bring to bear on the two sides to push them over the finishing line. This is in their best interests, too; if this conflict has managed to prove anything, it is that just when we think things cannot get any worse, they do. Should the fighting spread to Rafah, a catastrophe is almost inevitable. This would escalate the fragile situation in the Middle East very quickly, adversely affecting domestic politics and societies throughout the region and far beyond. This is reason enough to call for a united international front to do whatever is in its power to prevent such a horrific scenario, and to do it now. • Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the Middle East and North Africa Program at international affairs think tank Chatham House. X: @YMekelberg