After being voted back into power by the Indian electorate last month, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has retained most of his senior ministers in his new Cabinet, including former diplomat S. Jaishankar as the external affairs minister. In his first remarks to the media on June 11, Jaishankar said that resolving the remaining issues along the Line of Actual Control with China would be a priority for him. The next day, the spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi agreed that having a “stable relationship” was in the best interests of both countries and that the “relevant border issues should be handled properly,” so that the two countries can “push forward bilateral relations in the right direction.” The minister and the embassy were referring to the ongoing military standoff at the undemarcated border dividing China and India at Ladakh, where each side has mobilized about 60,000 troops, even as the two countries are rapidly upgrading infrastructure all across their 3,400 km-long border. In April 2020, China had first moved its troops into spaces at Ladakh that are claimed by India. This led to a hand-to-hand fight in which 20 Indian soldiers, including a colonel, were killed, along with an unknown number of Chinese casualties. Over the last four years, military commanders from both sides have met several times and the status quo has been reestablished at most points. Some areas are still unresolved and Jaishankar has prioritized the resolution of these differences. Commanders from both sides have met several times and the status quo has been reestablished at most points Talmiz Ahmad After several years of peace at the border, low-key military encounters began to occur from 2013 at Aksai Chin in Ladakh and continued at different sectors in 2014 and 2017. These were viewed as local issues and were quickly resolved. However, with the latest face-to-face standoff having lasted four years, Indian commentators believe that it reflects a new aggressiveness on the part of China along the lines of the robust Chinese claims vis-a-vis the South China Sea, Taiwan and Japan. Since these claims usually involve minor changes in the territorial scenario, observers describe them as “salami slicing” — a term that is also being applied to the latest Indian-Chinese military encounter. It should be noted that, besides Ladakh, China has also asserted claims at other parts of the border. Besides disputes over territory, India is also concerned about expanding Chinese influence in the neighboring countries of South Asia and the increasing presence of its warships in the Indian Ocean, both spheres being seen by India as part of its crucial strategic space. Above all, India has concerns about the substantial ties that China has with its neighbor, Pakistan. India has been criticizing Islamabad for more than three decades, accusing it of encouraging cross-border terrorism. Given the “all-weather” relationship that Pakistan has with China, in the event of its own ties with Beijing deteriorating precipitately, India fears it might face a two-front conflict. With the significant asymmetry in its equation vis-a-vis China, India has, over the last decade, expanded its security ties with the US through increased defense purchases, substantial interoperability agreements to facilitate military cooperation and institutionalized dialogue platforms at foreign and defense minister levels, all backed by frequent summit-level meetings. But India has retained its commitment to strategic autonomy by maintaining close ties with Russia and participating actively in groupings such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which include China. There is a basic difference in approach on the part of the two countries in regard to the border issue Talmiz Ahmad As of now, it is difficult to believe there could be a dramatic change in the content and trajectory of India-China relations in Modi’s third term. This is largely because there is a basic difference in approach on the part of the two countries in regard to the border issue. China believes that the border dispute is the legacy of colonial history and should not be allowed to influence ties negatively in other political and economic areas. India, however, prioritizes the restoration of the status quo at the border as a condition for the further development of bilateral relations. There is another problem. China, as former Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale has pointed out, has tended to shape its relations with India on the basis of its perceptions relating to the US’ approach to itself; it hardly ever sees India as an independent player. Hence, Gokhale concludes that the heightening of tensions at the border from 2013 is possibly linked with China’s concerns about India’s growing relations with Washington. Seeing India through the prism of the US’ approach to China and denying it any agency to shape its own policies to secure its interests is erroneous and unhelpful. China’s initiatives to change the status quo at the border have now persuaded Indian policymakers that ties with China are likely to be adversarial over the long term and have encouraged the development of domestic capabilities and resources to sustain the national interest. Thus, the gap between Indian and Chinese capabilities is being narrowed and this will ensure that future military provocations could result in high costs on both sides. There is nothing inevitable about Sino-Indian estrangement. It only requires China to accept that, given its history, India is not going to join any security grouping. India will engage widely to enhance its domestic capacities, but it will remain committed to strategic autonomy. This change in Chinese perceptions could form the basis for significantly improved bilateral relations during Modi’s third term in office. Talmiz Ahmad is a former Indian diplomat.