The election of reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian as Iran’s president has sparked numerous questions about his approach to foreign relations. Observers are keen to see the extent of both the change and the continuity in his foreign policy, particularly toward regional and international stakeholders, over the next four years. The potential impact on cooperation and tensions with Arab and Gulf countries is of particular interest. This comes at a time when hard-liners hold significant control over the Iranian state and the influence of reformists has waned since the end of former President Hassan Rouhani’s term. The new president will also face a challenging inheritance of domestic crises, which have led to widespread popular protests, as well as escalating disputes with Europeans and the US over the nuclear issue. Literature on the foreign policy of states suggests that a change in leadership affects four key areas: the content of foreign policy, the policymaking process, the tools and management of policy implementation and the outcomes of foreign policy. The extent of this impact varies based on the nature of the regime, the powers granted to the president in foreign affairs and the influence of the president’s party within the political landscape. Iran operates under a theocratic system in which ultimate authority rests with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The president, whether reformist or hard-liner, oversees the executive branch, implementing the broad directives set by Khamenei both domestically and internationally, in line with the jurisprudence enshrined in the constitution. The constitution grants the supreme leader absolute authority, giving him overarching control over all Iranian institutions. Consequently, significant changes in the content of foreign policy and the policymaking process are unlikely, as these are tied to the regime’s primary goals and interests, which center on establishing the alleged global Iranian state under the supreme leader’s guidance and leadership. Supporting the supreme leader’s policies is a near-constant rule in Iran, regardless of whether the president is a reformist or a hard-liner. Pezeshkian recognizes the stability of Iran’s foreign policy content and its formulation process. During his debates, he emphasized the importance of adhering to the supreme leader’s policies and directives to advance the country and address its issues. Therefore, Pezeshkian will follow his government program both domestically and internationally based on the foundational principles of the regime and the broad directives set by the supreme leader in the country’s foreign relations. There are conflicting views regarding Pezeshkian’s approval by the Guardian Council to run in the presidential election as the sole reformist candidate alongside five conservatives. Some argue that this was not a coincidence or a miscalculation by Iran, nor was it due to the strength of Pezeshkian and his movement, which has been divided since the end of Rouhani’s term. Instead, it may have been a strategic move by the regime to present a new, more acceptable reformist figure to Western European and American leaders, in contrast to the conservative candidates. This strategy could help the regime neutralize potential pressure campaigns, especially given the high likelihood of former US President Donald Trump returning to office in January. This perspective aligns with interpretations of Pezeshkian’s presidential victory and the leader’s preelection statements suggesting that the results would bring about global change. This implies that the outcome was anticipated, but the Guardian Council did not endorse a candidate who could not be controlled or who might challenge the regime’s policies. This is evidenced by Pezeshkian’s pledge during the debates to follow the supreme leader’s directives, his praise of Khamenei as a wise leader and the supreme leader’s encouragement of the new president to continue the path of the late Ebrahim Raisi. The latter had earned the guide’s trust through his absolute obedience and he maintained stable relations with all government institutions, in contrast to the tensions during Rouhani’s tenure, especially in foreign affairs. Supporting the supreme leader’s policies is a near-constant in Iran, regardless of whether the president is a reformist or a hard-liner. Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami The previous parameters, along with the supreme leader’s tools of control — such as the dominance of hard-liners over state institutions, parallel institutions and parliament, as well as the supreme leader’s broad and absolute powers — indicate the regime’s ability to impose control over the reformist president, allowing only managed change. Externally, this pertains to the third level, involving the tools and management of foreign policy implementation, and the fourth level, which concerns the results of foreign policy. Consequently, it is expected that foreign policy will follow these trajectories: Regionally, Pezeshkian may continue Raisi’s policy of improving relations with neighboring countries, guided by the supreme leader’s directives. This could involve strengthening ties with Arab and Gulf nations, which is consistent with Pezeshkian’s stated vision of openness to the world, starting with neighboring states. However, his stance on the so-called axis of resistance, which is pivotal to Iran’s regional strategy and a regime red line, was evident in his communications with Syrian President Bashar Assad and his correspondence with Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah and Hamas’ political bureau chief. Pezeshkian affirmed his strong support for resistance movements, particularly against Israeli occupation and notably during the Gaza conflict. There is a potential for tensions akin to those seen during Rouhani’s tenure between the Foreign Ministry and the Revolutionary Guards, possibly stemming from the Guards’ involvement in diplomatic affairs. Internationally, Pezeshkian is likely to continue the Rouhani-Javad Zarif approach of advocating for openness to the world through diplomacy and dialogue with the West. This strategy aims to facilitate Iran’s return to negotiations, which is seen as a more effective and expeditious solution to addressing internal challenges and enhancing Iran’s international standing. Pezeshkian’s supporters argue that relying solely on economic diplomacy to neutralize the impact of sanctions and improve living conditions may not suffice in the short term, necessitating swift negotiations, sanctions relief and potential accession to the Financial Action Task Force. Zarif’s endorsement of Pezeshkian underscores potential alignments on nuclear agreement strategies with the West, although ultimate decisions will rest with the supreme leader and institutional frameworks. Challenges include uncertainties surrounding US political dynamics, particularly the possibility of Trump’s return, and right-wing ascendance in Europe. Concurrently, Pezeshkian may bolster cooperation with China and Russia, given their pragmatic roles in enhancing Iran’s negotiation positions vis-a-vis the West. In conclusion, it is evident that Iranian presidents face red lines they cannot cross. They lack the authority to alter fundamental policies but play a prescribed role in implementing and managing policy tools and outcomes. Presidents operate within the constraints imposed by the institutions and councils aligned with the supreme leader. However, despite these limitations, Pezeshkian could potentially influence Iranian political life by recognizing the regime’s imperative to engage with the outside world during challenging times. His proposals, praise for the supreme leader, declaration of loyalty to his guidance and alignment with figures like Hassan Khomeini indicate his cautious approach and desire to avoid provoking early clashes with the regime. Unlike some reformists who are critical of the regime, Pezeshkian supports its revolutionary principles and seeks backing from the supreme leader, Iran’s institutions and the public. What is more, recent developments suggest the regime has the capacity for flexibility and innovation, aiming to bridge the widening gap with citizens, as highlighted by the low turnout in the first round of the presidential election. Externally, Iran seeks to alleviate its isolation amid ongoing protests. • Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami is the founder and president of the International Institute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah). X: @mohalsulami