All of this is happening for the first time. Israel has been waging a multifront war for almost 10 months, a war it does not have the capacity to decide. Lebanese Hezbollah has been waging a “support war” for the same time and it claims this war will only end once the Israeli assault on Gaza stops. A Palestinian organization has been fighting Israel throughout this period. And for the first time, drones and missiles launched from multiple locations, including Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon, have hit Israel. The Middle East has never seen anything like this before. It is no exaggeration to say that we entered a new phase of the conflict when a Houthi drone exploded near a US Embassy branch office in Tel Aviv, killing one Israeli and injuring others. For the first time since the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, Israel responded with airstrikes that targeted sites in Hodeidah, Yemen. The attack deliberately created a massive fire that Israeli officials claimed could be seen by all the peoples of the Middle East, not just Yemenis. Like Hezbollah, the Houthis have also been waging a support war, targeting what they claim to be Israeli ships or those heading to Israeli ports, as well as occasionally announcing that they have targeted sites in Israel itself. It was clear that the US had previously pressured Israel not to hit back against the Houthis so that escalation could be avoided, especially after the US and UK launched measured reprisals to Houthi actions. It seemed that Washington had succeeded in diverting the trajectory that had been leading the region to a broader war. We entered a new phase of the conflict when a Houthi drone exploded near a US Embassy branch office in Tel Aviv Ghassan Charbel The exchange of direct strikes between Iran and Israel was quickly halted and Hezbollah ensured that the “rules of engagement” were not broken during this conflict, with Israel behaving in similar fashion. Suddenly, these strikes broke the restrictions of the old rules of engagement. The Houthis bombed Tel Aviv directly, which naturally drew an immediate Israeli response. Israel disregarded the commitments it had made to the Americans and launched its attack on Hodeidah, seemingly deciding to retaliate to what it considered an “Iranian message.” My interest in the regional thread of the Houthi story was aroused by a question President Ali Abdullah Saleh had asked me at the end of an interview I conducted with him in 2008. Smiling, he asked: “What does Hezbollah want from the Houthis?” I asked him to clarify what he meant. “We have definitive reports that small groups of Houthis are traveling to Damascus, where they are received by Hezbollah, which then escorts them into Lebanese territory and has them enter without having their passports stamped at the Syrian-Lebanese border. Hezbollah trains them in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon and they then return to Damascus the same way they had come to Lebanon, before returning to Sanaa,” he told me. The president had also received reports indicating that some young Houthis were studying in Iranian seminaries. In that same year, Gen. Qassem Soleimani was weaving the threads of the resistance axis’s regional tapestry. He continued to drain the American military forces in Iraq, after having supported the 2006 war on Israel launched from Lebanon. This war overturned the formulas that had been in place in Lebanon following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanese territory. In a 2009 interview, I asked Saleh about the rumors that Iran had been supporting efforts to spread Shiism in Yemen. He responded reservedly, saying: “You could say that this has been happening since the beginning of the Iranian revolution that brought down Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Our brothers in Iran were clear about their intentions and the notion of exporting the revolution.” The following year, Saleh told me that the authorities had noticed “similarities between the tactics of the Houthis and those of Hezbollah in Lebanon.” I asked him about the Houthis’ arms and he said that they were obtained from the local market. “You could say support was provided by proponents of the new project, what is called the promotion of a new doctrine, Twelver Shiism, instead of the Zaidi or Shafi’i doctrines that are prevalent in Yemen. They received donations from parties, organizations or associations in regional states and used them to buy these arms. Arms dealers and regional powers who were helping the Houthis, to promote their own agenda, also smuggled weapons to them by sea.” I asked him if the Houthi problem could be understood as part of a sectarian struggle in the region. “No. It is not a Sunni-Shiite conflict, but rather an effort to promote a new doctrine in the region to preoccupy it, preoccupy Yemen and to preoccupy Saudi Arabia in particular, as well as to send messages to small or large regional countries that had played a role in this regard,” Saleh said. Saleh did not hide the fact that he was not willing to make the dispute with Iran and Hezbollah public. Years later, “Saleh deluded himself into thinking that he could form a temporary alliance with the Houthis to contain them before confronting them. He paid with his life to play this game, because he forgot that the project the Houthis are part of is regional before being local,” as an official who had worked with him put it. Saleh’s remarks help us understand the latest chapter and the conflict between the Houthis and Israel. There are many questions. Why have the frequency and scope of the strikes expanded to reach Tel Aviv and Hodeidah? Did Iran want to suggest that a regional war was on the cards in order to impose a ceasefire during Joe Biden’s term? Or is it preparing to welcome Donald Trump, if he is reelected, with new facts on the ground in this unprecedented conflict? Did Iran want to send a message to the new president: call this number if you want to put out the fires in the Middle East and discuss roles, interests and influence? Does Iran seek a leading role in the region, the bomb, or both? Does it want an acknowledgment of its right to hold the keys to four Arab countries? Ghassan Charbel is editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper. X: @GhasanCharbel This article first appeared in Asharq Al-Awsat.