The idea of a Eurasian security system has gained more attention recently as a response to the consolidation of NATO unity and its expanded membership since the start of the Ukraine war. While the idea has been around for some time, that war and the increasing polarization between Russia and NATO have made the idea more attractive, as have the US-China tensions and trade war. When NATO celebrated its 75th anniversary in Washington earlier this month, it appeared very united, striking a confident pose and seeking new partnerships around the world. The organization seems to have overcome differences over the requisite defense spending of no less than 2 percent of the gross domestic product of each member state and is even contemplating raising that threshold. Unlike NATO, which is a military alliance more or less united under US leadership, the Eurasian security architecture is proposed to be more diffuse, with several if not many poles, depending on which countries and organizations join the new architecture. In February, President Vladimir Putin, in his state of the nation speech to the Federal Assembly, stressed the need to form a “new contour of equal and indivisible security in Eurasia.” He said that Russia was ready for a substantive conversation on this topic with interested parties and associations. During a visit to Beijing in April, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke of an “agreement” with China to begin a dialogue on this security system. He appeared to link the need for this new structure to the recent consolidation of NATO and the failure of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to play an effective role in dealing with European conflicts. While the alliance known as the Warsaw Pact disbanded at the end of the Cold War, NATO remained intact, even attracting former Warsaw Pact members such as Bulgaria, Poland and Romania and, more recently, enlisting previously neutral countries such as Finland and Sweden. The 75th anniversary this year is testimony to its resilience as one of the world’s strongest and most enduring military alliances. The OSCE’s valiant attempts to bring together European adversaries from both camps were successful in mediating minor conflicts, but it has failed to bridge the gap in the Ukraine conflict. The lofty ideas of a united Europe have given way to war and destruction. While NATO and Russia are not officially at war, it is clear that Europe now has a skewed bipolarity, with an expanded and empowered NATO on one side and Russia on the other without its former Warsaw Pact allies. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the failure of pan-European projects, the expansion of NATO and now the war in Ukraine, with Kyiv supported by the US and most European nations, Russia and its close allies are advancing the idea of a Eurasian security system. China is one of the main potential players in this proposed security space. The world’s top exporter and second-largest economy, China is also developing its military capabilities. More importantly, it is being alienated by the US and Europe and a full-fledged trade war is taking shape between the two camps. The risk of armed conflict over Taiwan and the South China Sea should not be ruled out. While Russia and China are the two main potential members of the Eurasian security system, Beijing has yet to publicly subscribe to this system. It is also clear that Russia is seeking to establish a more inclusive security system with several poles. It is clear that Russia is seeking to establish a more inclusive security system with several poles. Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg It is not yet clear how multidisciplinary the new proposal is. Would it focus on defense and security issues or have a wider writ? Considering how heterogeneous the Eurasian space is, it would be difficult to imagine that there would be many countries interested in entering a military alliance. However, if the security architecture focuses on political and economic concerns, it could attract more followers. It would also be likely that some countries would be interested in joint work on hybrid or asymmetrical threats, such as terrorism and cyberwarfare. The new security system should spell out the set of guiding principles for its work. The most obvious is respect for international law, including the UN Charter. That means respect for the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of all states. As the OSCE seems to have lost its ability to function in the face of acute polarization, the new security architecture should include a dispute resolution mechanism, as many of the potential Eurasian partners have border or other disputes with each other, such as India and Pakistan, India and China, Iran and several of its neighbors, and so on. Some would ask about the need for a new security system when the Shanghai Cooperation Organization can do much of what the new system is expected to do. This grouping includes in its membership China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran and others. It also includes about a dozen partners, including Saudi Arabia and most of the Gulf Cooperation Council member states. In sum, there is certainly a need for peacemakers. The devastating war in Ukraine has pitted two camps armed to the teeth with nuclear and conventional weapons against each other. They are determined to settle their conflict on the battlefield, as has been the case throughout most of Europe’s history. Therefore, to make the proposal more attractive, the new Eurasian security architecture should be defensive and a force for peace, not a mere counterbalance to NATO. It should try to defuse, not stoke, the tensions around Ukraine, Gaza and other trouble spots. The new architecture should also take advantage of existing organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which has been around for decades. This group’s summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, earlier this month called for the creation of a fair multipolar world order based on the key role of the UN, international law and the aspiration of sovereign states toward a mutually beneficial partnership. • Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg is the Gulf Cooperation Council assistant secretary-general for political affairs and negotiation. The views expressed here are personal and do not necessarily represent the GCC. 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