As the Rohingya crisis drags on, Bangladesh faces new challenges, with more refugees seeking shelter from the ongoing civil war pouring over its border. The Rohingya in camps in Bangladesh are eager to return home and the International Court of Justice’s verdict on July 22, 2022, rejecting Myanmar’s preliminary objections, paves the way for eventual accountability for the most persecuted minority in the world. However, critics argue that any repatriation plan must uphold the principle of non-refoulement. Several pathways for Rohingya repatriation have emerged, involving various national and international stakeholders. The New Lines Institute last month published a groundbreaking report looking at alternative pathways to possible Rohingya repatriation. The most obvious approach is for Bangladesh to work bilaterally with Myanmar, as it has tried to do since the crisis began. This approach included the signing of a memorandum of arrangement in 2017 that stipulated that the return of displaced persons would begin soon and be completed in a “time-bound manner.” However, this approach has faced three major issues: the signing of an “arrangement” instead of a legally binding agreement, a lack of a clear timeline and a vague process for repatriation. The flexibility allowed Myanmar to delay the process. Moreover, during these bilateral meetings, a crucial issue seems to have been ignored: Myanmar’s potential genocide and crimes against humanity. Despite clear evidence of mass atrocities, Bangladesh’s diplomatic gestures, such as gifting ambulances to Myanmar, suggested a softer stance. This subdued approach, despite the moral high ground, has limited progress in repatriation efforts. The involvement of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has been critical. The 2017 arrangement included provisions for the UNHCR and other UN agencies to assist in the return and resettlement of the Rohingya. However, significant progress has not been made and the focus of these agencies has shifted more toward Bangladesh than Myanmar. One critical area has been education. The UN has urged Bangladesh to provide education to Rohingya refugees, but the debate centers on the language of instruction. Balancing the need for communication in the host community’s language and equipping refugees with skills for their future in Myanmar is essential. A two-fold policy of achieving 100 percent literacy and teaching English could benefit both the Rohingya and the local population. In 2019, Bangladesh, Myanmar and China formed a tripartite joint working mechanism for Rohingya repatriation. Several meetings have taken place, with the latest in Kunming in April 2023, discussing a pilot project for repatriation. China’s interest in resolving the crisis stems from its investments in both countries and a desire to offset Western influences in Myanmar. China’s significant investments in Bangladesh and Myanmar drive its quest for stability. Furthermore, resolving the Rohingya crisis could enhance Beijing’s regional and global status. Despite these interests, the tripartite approach has yet to achieve substantial progress. The pilot project plans to repatriate more than 1,000 Rohingya refugees, but mixed reactions from Rohingya representatives and the lack of UNHCR involvement pose challenges. The West has imposed limited sanctions on Myanmar’s military, but broader economic sanctions are necessary. Dr. Azeem Ibrahim In the past five years, significant strides have been made in addressing accountability for crimes committed against Rohingyas. The International Court of Justice has made two provisional rulings acknowledging the genocide by the Myanmar military and recognizing the Rohingya identity. This was a major legal victory for the Rohingya. The court’s hearings on the Rohingya genocide took place in December 2019, with Gambia bringing the charges against Myanmar. By January 2020, the court had granted the provisional measures requested by Gambia. The ruling was unanimous, which Myanmar did not anticipate. The court’s identification of the group as “Rohingyas” was also critical, countering Myanmar’s efforts to deny their identity. This recognition challenges Myanmar’s long-standing policy of disenfranchising and dehumanizing the Rohingya people, as enshrined in its 2008 constitution, which ties representation to race, thus excluding them. Myanmar’s labeling of the Rohingya as “Bengalis” or “illegal migrants” has become untenable due to growing international scrutiny and legal pressure. The International Criminal Court and the US have recognized the genocide, further pressuring Myanmar. Sanctions are a crucial tool to enforce accountability. The West has imposed limited sanctions on Myanmar’s military, but broader economic sanctions are necessary. The strategic use of sanctions can compel Myanmar to address human rights abuses and the Rohingya crisis. Companies investing in Myanmar should also be held accountable for complicity in these crimes. Economic pressure, if correctly applied, can incentivize Myanmar to change its policies. Another possible approach that needs further exploration is decoupling, a policy of separating specific activities from others. Japan, for example, co-sponsored a UN resolution favoring the Rohingya, signaling a shift in its strategic interests. Recognizing the Rohingya identity and inviting their delegations can pressure Myanmar to acknowledge and address the crisis. Economic incentives could also play a role. A so-called mini-Marshall Plan for the Arakan region could provide the Myanmar military with a legal and profitable alternative to the drug trade, fostering stability and encouraging Rohingya repatriation. The potential for militancy remains a significant concern. The 2017 attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and the subsequent military crackdown highlight the volatile situation. The Rohingya youth, particularly those in refugee camps, are at risk of being drawn into militancy if the crisis remains unresolved. These pathways resemble an octopus, with each arm representing a different approach to resolving the Rohingya crisis. While some pathways show more promise, it is premature to determine which will have the most lasting impact. The complexity and sensitivity of the situation require a patient and multifaceted approach. • Dr. Azeem Ibrahim is the director of special initiatives at the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington, DC. X: @AzeemIbrahim