Since Oct. 7 Hezbollah has lost many of its operational leaders to Israeli strikes. One of the most recent targets was Fouad Shukr, a senior military leader of the group. He was designated a terrorist by the US State Department, which put a $5 million bounty on his head in 2017. On July 30, Shukr died in an Israeli attack in Beirut. The killing of such a senior commander leaves Hezbollah’s leadership facing a dilemma over whether to respond or not. In either case, they will face grave consequences. Hassan Nasrallah, the group’s leader, said in a televised address last Thursday that the response will come when it suits them, and when they find a proper target opportunity. Social media has been full of anecdotes mocking the group and also Iran. Unlike Iran, however, Hezbollah faces not only external enemies, but also internal threats. The group cannot afford to show weakness to its domestic enemies. Thus a response is all but imperative. However, in Tehran, the situation might be looked at differently. Ayman Safadi, Jordan’s foreign minister, has been shuttling around the region trying to find a formula for de-escalation. What is proposed now is that Iran gives up on its promise to avenge the killing of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in return for a ceasefire in Gaza. On Aug. 8, US President Joe Biden, Egyptian leader Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, and Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani issued a joint statement calling for a truce, and for an end to the suffering of the people of Gaza and the families of the hostages. A Lebanese news website said that Hezbollah will avenge the killing of its senior military leader regardless of the mediators’ efforts. Hezbollah needs to re-establish deterrence. There is nothing that can stop Israel from continuing its assassinations in the wake of Oct. 7. Some of these killings were likely based on intelligence gathered through its networks of informers over the years. No one knows who they are still after. Hezbollah’s main aim will be to stop the string of assassinations. Can that be done without reestablishing deterrence, and making Israel understand that for each killing it will pay a heavy price? However, if Hezbollah does respond, it will also face grave consequences. The problem with war is that it has many unknown unknowns. Hezbollah does not know how Israel will respond. The conflict can quickly cross the established rules of engagement. Will Israel turn Lebanon into Gaza? Will a ceasefire allow the group a graceful exit? Possibly, but a truce does not guarantee that Israel will halt the assassinations, especially since these have been quite successful. Yoav Gallant, Israel’s defense minister, has said previously that Lebanon is a separate issue from Gaza. Hence, a ceasefire may not mean that Israel would leave Hezbollah alone. The group cannot afford to show weakness to its domestic enemies. Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib Shukr’s killing shows one thing clearly: The group has been infiltrated. Who could have known where the Hezbollah commander would be staying? The information must have come from within a close circle. The group is also technologically inferior to Israel, which is another sign of weakness. Hezbollah is supposed to be a resistance to Israel, but the latter has been able to hunt it down easily. The group’s main objective is to stop the assassinations. How can they do that? If they land a painful blow, it might deter Israel, or encourage it to further hit the group and the country. If Israel devastates Lebanon, Hezbollah’s enemies will blame it for pushing Lebanon into a situation the country cannot handle. Even if Hezbollah handles the strike militarily, it will be difficult to handle it politically. In 2006, the majority of Lebanese stood together at the time of the Israeli attack. Divisions began emerging only after the strike. This time, if Israel attacks, the divisions will be deeper and opposition to the group will be stronger. There is another issue: the weak support Hezbollah has internally. A study by the Washington Institute think tank showed that while 93 percent of Shiites have a positive view of the group, only 29 percent of Christians and 34 percent of Sunnis view it favorably. Those divisions might lead to civil war. Hence, either choice will leave the group facing grave consequences. If Israel hits Lebanon heavily, Hezbollah’s opponent will blame the group for the calamity. This might result in a civil war. If Hezbollah does nothing, its internal enemies will be strengthened and its supporters disappointed. The group is in a difficult situation. The 2006 war may have shown Hezbollah’s strength, but the current conflict has revealed its vulnerability. That is a bad message to send to both Israel and its internal enemies. What will it do? Will it offer concessions to its opponent internally in order to create some consensus? Will it offer concessions on the election of a president in return for support for its struggle with Israel? The group does not trust anybody, and it will be difficult to surrender control without trust in other Lebanese factions. The other option is to protect itself and avoid involving the country in a war that could involve a third party. In my last article, I mentioned that Lebanon should accept Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s offer to intervene. However, this would mean it would have to share influence with the Turks. They did accept sharing influence with the Russians in Syria because the other option was to lose Syria altogether to the opposition. With Turkiye, they will probably have a better deal than with the Russians. The Russians are not using their air defense in Syria. Israel goes wherever it wants, and kills the Iranian and Hezbollah personnel it wants. Turkiye could be asked to protect Lebanese airspace. Whatever decision Hezbollah favors, it faces a hard choice. The group will only make concessions when it realizes the current situation is unsustainable. Does it understand this? We still do not know. Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib is a specialist in US-Arab relations with a focus on lobbying. She is co-founder of the Research Center for Cooperation and Peace Building, a Lebanese nongovernmental organization focused on Track II.