“There is no reason not to establish relations between Turkiye and Syria,” declared Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the end of July, signaling a notable shift in Ankara’s stance toward Damascus. This statement comes a decade after his remarks on Oct. 10, 2014, when the Turkish leader described Bashar Assad as a “criminal and terrorist,” and “a greater threat than Daesh.” To understand this significant shift in Turkish policy, it is essential to review the trajectory of relations between the two countries, and the regional and international changes that have contributed to this transformation. Before the outbreak of protests in Syria in 2011, Turkiye and Syria were in a state of close cooperation. The two countries were linked by strong economic and political ties, with Turkiye seeking to enhance cooperation in various fields with its southern neighbor. However, with the onset of the Syrian civil war, relations dramatically shifted. After the protests began, Turkiye initially adopted a diplomatic stance, calling for political reforms in Syria. As the violence escalated, Turkiye sent its foreign minister to Damascus with a “strongly worded” message and, soon after, began supporting the opposition that sought to overthrow Assad’s regime. During this period, Turkiye’s position hardened, as Ankara called for Assad’s ouster, and deemed his regime a threat to regional security. In June 2012, Erdogan said that “Anatolia’s security starts from Damascus,” emphasizing that any Syrian movements near the Turkish border would be considered a threat. Assad was equally confrontational toward the Turks, repeatedly accusing Ankara of supporting terrorism for expansionist and ideological reasons, as well as stealing Syria and Iraq’s share of the Euphrates River. In 2019, during an interview with Sputnik News and Russia 24, Assad publicly attacked Turkiye, claiming that it wanted to gather “terrorists” under Turkish protection in areas controlled by the Turkish military in northeast Syria under the guise of returning refugees. He said: “No one believes that Turkiye wants to return 3 million Syrian refugees to this area ... This humanitarian front is meant to deceive. Even if they wanted to, it would be impossible because it would create conflict between the rightful owners of these lands, cities, villages, homes, and fields, and the newcomers, as the rightful owners will not relinquish their rights in those areas.” Recently, we have witnessed a significant shift in Turkish policy. Erdogan has expressed a desire to restore relations with Syria to their former state, and said that Turkiye is ready to invite Assad to visit at any time. Erdogan has expressed a desire to restore relations to their former state Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy This shift seems to reflect changes in the regional and international dynamics that have influenced Turkish policy. But what are the real motivations behind Erdogan’s change of stance? There are several reasons. First, Syrian refugees in Turkiye have become a political and economic burden. With increasing public discontent over their presence, Ankara is seeking to create the conditions for their return. In recent weeks, there have been growing calls in Turkiye to expel Syrians, along with significant attacks on refugees in the streets, buses, and subways — many captured by mobile phone cameras and widely circulated on social media. The second motivation is the Kurdish presence. Turkiye is deeply concerned about the presence of Kurdish forces in northern Syria, especially the YPG, which it considers an extension of the PKK, designated a terrorist organization by many countries. Turkiye aims to establish a buffer zone free of Kurdish militias along its border. The third motivation is the regional and international pressure on the Syrian regime, including US pressure to support the Kurdish project in Syria, which complicates Turkiye’s calculations and may have led Ankara to seek closer ties with Damascus as a countermeasure. In contrast, Russia and Iran are pushing for the rehabilitation and strengthening of the Syrian regime, restoring its Arab and regional influence, which also contributed to Turkiye’s change of stance. Turkiye now seeks to ally with strong regional powers, and Syria is well-positioned to play a significant role in this regard. Another motivation could be termed “Ankara’s political strategy.” With elections approaching, Erdogan aims to address the refugee issue and improve Turkiye’s relations with its neighbors. Closer ties with Syria could bolster his political standing domestically, sending reassuring messages about Turkiye’s foreign policy to both domestic and international allies. The final motivation concerns the general geopolitical situation. The US military presence in the region has noticeably declined and may diminish further if Donald Trump returns to the White House, or remain as is if Kamala Harris wins. Therefore, Turkiye, Syria, and other alliances are seeking to fill the geopolitical void that Washington might leave in the region. Both countries aim to reshape the regional situation to their advantage Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy I believe that both countries aim to reshape the regional situation to their advantage, whether economically or politically, after years of sanctions on Syria and years of tension with regional powers, as was the case with Turkiye, which spent almost a decade estranged from important regimes in the region such as Egypt. Despite all the talk about Erdogan and the Turkish regime’s strong desire to reconcile with Assad’s regime in Syria, and the motivations I mentioned earlier, there are still significant challenges to this rapprochement. The first is the low level of trust between the two regimes. Relations between Ankara and Damascus have been severely strained in the past, particularly with Turkiye’s continued support for certain opposition groups and its military presence in northern Syria — two major points of contention between the countries. The second challenge is the Kurdish presence. It will be difficult for Turkiye and Syria to reach an agreement on the Kurdish issue, as Damascus views the presence of Kurdish forces as an obstacle to reclaiming control over Syrian territory. Moreover, the Kurdish issue is a long-standing and intractable problem that has defied resolution for many years. External pressures could also hinder reconciliation between the two countries. Russia and Iran, as Assad’s main allies, may have conflicting interests in this rapprochement, which could influence how relations between Ankara and Damascus develop. If the talks between Turkiye and Syria succeed, the results could be positive. Stability in Syria could lead to reduced refugee flows and ease the burden on neighboring countries, such as Turkiye, Jordan, and Lebanon. It could also enhance regional cooperation on issues such as counterterrorism and economic reconstruction. Successful reconciliation between Turkiye and Syria could strengthen the former’s position as a key mediator in the Middle East, potentially improving its relations with other regional powers and even extending to better relations with the EU. For Syria, the rapprochement could contribute to greater internal stability and bolster control over the remaining disputed territories. Attempts at reconciliation between the two countries represent a significant development in the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. While there are clear motivations for rapprochement, there are also substantial obstacles. The outcomes of these negotiations will depend on the ability to balance the interests of both countries in the region. Success could lead to deeper regional stability, while failure might result in renewed conflict and instability, something we have suffered from greatly over the past decade.