Iranian officials have consistently asserted that the country’s nuclear program is intended for peaceful purposes, and denied any plans to develop a nuclear weapon — emphasizing that such a weapon has no place in Iranian military doctrine, and citing a fatwa from the Supreme Leader on the matter. However, a significant shift in Iranian rhetoric has emerged since Oct. 7 and the war in Gaza. In addition, following the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Iranian media has featured interviews with officials openly discussing the potential for manufacturing a nuclear bomb. On Feb. 12, 2024, Ali Akbar Salehi, the former foreign minister, and previous head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said in a television interview that Iran possesses everything necessary to produce an atomic bomb. Then, on April 18, shortly after Israel targeted the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Ahmad Haghtalab, commander of the Nuclear Protection Corps, a unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp, remarked that “it is possible that the Islamic Republic’s nuclear doctrine and policies will be reviewed and move away from the previously announced considerations.” In an extensive interview with the “reformist” Shargh newspaper a few days after Haniyeh’s assassination, Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a member of the Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said: “I believe that we have only one way to achieve strategic and final deterrence against the Zionist regime and the rest of the enemies, and that is ... manufacturing a nuclear bomb.” Ardestani argues that unless Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, Israel’s policy of sabotage and assassinations will continue. “Manufacturing nuclear weapons is the only way out for Iran from the challenges, and the political, diplomatic, and security impasse,” he said. A significant shift in Iranian rhetoric has emerged since the war in Gaza Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami In terms of the likely international response to Iran developing a nuclear weapon, Ardestani holds a controversial view, believing it will not precipitate a war against Iran, but rather mark a historical milestone. He points to warnings previously directed at Iran regarding an attack on Israel, observing that nothing transpired following the launch of 300 Iranian missiles and drones in April. He also argues that reaching the nuclear threshold will not result in an international consensus for military action or sanctions, saying that neither “the US nor Israel itself has the desire or ability to wage war against Iran.” According to Ardestani, the US might engage in sabre-rattling by deploying battleships and aircraft carriers, but would never actually order these to strike Tehran. He also dismisses the possibility of global sanctions being reinstated against Iran, contending that “the international community cannot bear another crisis.” He posits that reaching the nuclear threshold would provide the Iranian government with a powerful bargaining chip in negotiations with the West. Ardestani has previously made the provocative claim that Iran has already developed a nuclear weapon, but has chosen not to disclose this fact publicly. “Our policy is to obtain a nuclear bomb, but the announced policy is to act within the framework of the nuclear agreement,” he said. He suggested that there might be a clandestine site somewhere within Iran’s vast territory dedicated to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, emphasizing that these sites certainly would not be accessible to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Tehran has reminded the world that it may possess a more potent option Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami It is true that these statements might be intended to coerce the international community into making concessions, while also pressuring Israel to cease crossing what Iran considers its red lines. However, it should not be entirely ruled out that these statements could also serve as a precursor to announcing the development of a nuclear bomb. The assassination of Haniyeh on Iranian territory could serve as a justification in this context. The Tehran regime had assumed that its missile and drone attacks, even if merely symbolic, would compel Israel to limit its targeting of Iran. However, Haniyeh’s assassination has left the regime believing that missiles and drones alone are insufficient to achieve the desired level of deterrence. Iran has also begun to fear that as Israel continues to target leaders and operatives of militias aligned with Iran, their effectiveness as deterrents will wane. Consequently, Iran has reminded the world that it may possess a more potent and enduring option that could be employed at a critical moment: the nuclear bomb. In this context, some observers blame Israel for pushing Iran toward acquiring nuclear weapons. There is a growing belief among some Iranian decision-makers that despite the US administration’s vow that it will prevent Tehran from developing a nuclear weapon, and regardless of its warnings that “all options are on the table,” military conflict with Iran is unlikely. Many within the regime argue that the most the US might do is impose further sanctions for a limited time, and that, eventually, the world will be forced to accept Iran’s new status. While the accuracy of this viewpoint remains uncertain, it highlights the precarious balance of power and the potential for a significant geopolitical shift.