Many analysts anticipated a swift and forceful reaction from Iran following last month’s assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran by Israeli forces. The expectation was that Iran would retaliate by launching a direct attack on Israel, but the situation appears to have taken a different turn, with a spokesman for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps last week stating that it would not take “hasty action.” So, what has changed? And what internal dynamics are influencing this restraint? In the immediate aftermath of Haniyeh’s assassination, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued directives for Iran’s retaliation against Israel. This move seemed to align with the expectations of many, including Western officials, who early this month believed that a response was imminent. The US military was even put on high alert in preparation for a potential Iranian strike. On Aug. 4, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken cautioned that an Iranian attack on Israel could commence within 24 to 48 hours. The global community, particularly those familiar with Iran’s previous actions, was on edge, anticipating an immediate and severe response. This expectation was partly rooted in Iran’s history, especially following the events of April 13. On that day, Iran launched a barrage of drones and missiles at Israel, fulfilling its vow to retaliate for an Israeli airstrike on its consulate in Damascus on April 1, which resulted in the deaths of seven IRGC officers, including high-ranking commanders. Given that Iran had responded similarly before, and with Khamenei himself endorsing the retaliation, the world was braced for a swift escalation. However, Iran’s initial rhetoric promising a quick strike might have been a heat-of-the-moment reaction and cooler heads may have prevailed as the political landscape evolved. Some speculate that diplomatic efforts from global leaders may have played a role in persuading Iran to delay or reconsider its response. Nevertheless, this restraint contrasts sharply with Iran’s actions in April, raising questions about a shift in Tehran’s strategy. This restraint contrasts sharply with Iran’s actions in April, raising questions about a shift in Tehran’s strategy Dr. Majid Rafizadeh Another theory, as suggested to Reuters by three senior Iranian officials, was that Tehran might have been holding off on its attack while a ceasefire agreement in Gaza appeared feasible. However, this strategy seems inconsistent with Iran’s actions in April, when no such considerations were made. The change in Iran’s political calculus might be driven by the fear of falling into an Israeli trap. Tehran might perceive that Tel Aviv is attempting to provoke a direct conflict with Iran, bypassing its usual proxy battles. Such a conflict could easily draw in the US, which would likely side with Israel, tilting the military balance decisively against Iran. This scenario presents a significant risk for Tehran, which might explain its hesitation to engage directly. In addition, the current geopolitical environment differs from that of April. Back then, the Biden administration exerted considerable pressure on Israel to avoid escalating the conflict after Iran’s attack. This time, however, there has been an absence of such diplomatic pressure. Furthermore, President Joe Biden’s recent decision not to seek reelection and instead endorse Vice President Kamala Harris as his potential successor may have altered the political dynamics, potentially emboldening Israel and influencing Iran’s decision-making. Furthermore, the Iranian government is likely taking a hard look at the implications of engaging in an all-out war with Israel — a scenario that offers a multitude of serious challenges. On the domestic front, Iran is grappling with significant economic difficulties that have left the country in a vulnerable state. A prolonged military conflict with Israel would only exacerbate these economic woes, stretching Iran’s already limited resources even thinner and potentially leading to widespread financial instability. The government is also well aware that such economic strain could further inflame public dissatisfaction and unrest. The Iranian government is likely taking a hard look at the implications of engaging in an all-out war with Israel Dr. Majid Rafizadeh Adding to these challenges is the notable decline in public support for the government, as seen in the low turnout in the recent presidential and parliamentary elections. This low engagement reflects a growing disenchantment among the Iranian populace, who are increasingly frustrated with the government’s inability to address domestic problems, including economic hardship, unemployment and sociopolitical issues. The leadership in Tehran understands that entering into a war with Israel, especially under these circumstances, could push public discontent to breaking point. From a military perspective, Iran is acutely aware of the significant power imbalance it would face in a direct conflict with Israel, particularly if the US were to become involved. Despite Iran’s substantial investments in its military and its development of proxy forces throughout the region, the combined military capabilities of Israel and the US are far superior. The assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran was a significant blow to the Iranian government, both in terms of prestige and perceived security. For the Iranian leadership, especially the supreme leader, failing to follow through on threats of retaliation could be seen as a sign of weakness, further damaging the regime’s credibility. Thus, Iran finds itself in a position where it must justify its inaction, despite its earlier promises of swift revenge. Nevertheless, it is likely to keep the option of retaliation on the table as a strategic leverage point. By maintaining the threat of future attacks, Iran can keep Israel and its allies on edge, using the possibility of escalation as a bargaining chip to advance its broader geopolitical objectives. In conclusion, Iran’s decision to refrain from launching an immediate and direct attack on Israel appears to be the result of complex political calculations aimed at avoiding a potentially catastrophic conflict that could involve the US and threaten the Tehran regime’s hold on power. However, the ongoing threat of retaliation remains a key element of Iran’s strategy, serving as a tool for maintaining pressure on Israel and securing its demands in the regional and international arenas. Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a Harvard-educated Iranian American political scientist. X: @Dr_Rafizadeh