The outbreak of conflict between Israel and Hezbollah begins to look depressingly familiar. Many have noted similarities with the 2006 war, while Lebanese and Israeli civilians fear a return to the sustained destruction of that 34-day conflict. However, there is already a significant difference from 2006: the scale of the violence. In 2006, the total number of deaths in Lebanon was 1,100, while 43 Israelis were killed, according to Amnesty International. The same organization noted that last Monday, 558 Lebanese, including 50 children and 94 women, were killed. Already the casualty figures for the first week of conflict are getting close to the numbers killed in just over a month in 2006. The same shift in scale has been visible in the Gaza conflict. The Oct. 7 attacks saw 1,139 killed in Israel, including 695 civilians — the deadliest attack in Israel’s history. Since then, according to the UN, more than 41,000 Palestinians have been killed. By way of comparison, in the various Gaza conflicts and attacks between 2008 and 2023, over 6,400 Palestinians and 308 Israelis died. So, why is the scale in both conflicts so much greater? There are many possible explanations: The extent of trauma in Israel after Oct. 7 prompted its government to react more violently than in the past; Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing government is arguably the most hawkish in Israel’s history; the uncompromising nature of Hamas’ leadership; and Hezbollah’s willingness to strike deeper into Israel. All have likely played some role in escalating the violence. But another factor is also at play: the role of the US. In the 2006 war, and again in Israel’s various conflicts in Gaza such as in 2008-09, 2012 and 2014, Washington sanctioned Israel’s assaults, but eventually weighed in to pressure its ally into a ceasefire. Today, however, the influence of the US is far less pronounced. As has been noted by many commentators, the last decade or so has seen the development of a “post-American Middle East,” with Washington stepping back from its self-appointed role as “regional policeman.” The US remains the most powerful external player, but Russia and China now have increased influence. Washington’s powerful regional allies — Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Egypt, the UAE and Israel — increasingly act independently of the US, while its enemy Iran has expanded its network of allied militia, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. For many, this comparative retreat of the US is long overdue, especially after its destabilizing interventions following 9/11 in 2001. But there was another aspect to its hegemony: As the only superpower, the US was often able to pressure, cajole, and mediate both allies and enemies in the region at times of crisis. In the case of Israel’s wars, it invariably sided with Israel, but nevertheless appeared able to eventually help bring about ceasefires. In contrast, the aftermath of Oct. 7 has seen President Joe Biden repeatedly fail to restrain Netanyahu, despite the White House’s repeated efforts. The scale of conflict seen in Lebanon and Gaza could prove a regular feature of the post-American Middle East. Christopher Phillips Many have been frustrated at Biden’s unwillingness to halt arms sales to Israel to force Netanyahu’s hand, but in the past such drastic moves were not necessary for Washington to exercise influence. Biden’s weakness may partly be down to an ailing president fearful that too much criticism of Israel will aid Donald Trump’s electoral chances in November. But it may also reflect Netanyahu’s recognition that Washington is not willing to put in the military and economic capital to police the Middle East as it once did. With less fear of censure and consequence from Washington, Netanyahu’s government appears less restrained than Israeli leaderships of the past. This places the rest of the region in something of a predicament. Many, even among America’s allies, welcome Washington’s stepping back from the region, and few want a return to the military interventions of the early 2000s. There is little indication that either Kamala Harris or Trump wish to reclaim the role of the Middle East’s policeman, while the empowerment of China, Russia, and the regional powers would likely make it far harder to do even if desired. The post-American Middle East is, therefore, likely to continue for the foreseeable future, and with it could come an environment in which the more powerful players, such as Israel, feel less restrained. How other governments can respond to this is unclear. They could lobby the US to play a more active role once again, as has been the strategy of some since Oct. 7, but without much success. They could urge other external powers to step into the role of “regional policeman,” but Russia lacks the capacity, China lacks the will and, as was seen before, most in the Middle East are not keen on having an outside hegemon anyway. Another option is for regional powers to work together to develop more robust stabilizing mechanisms. If Israel, or others, cannot be restrained by outsiders, are there diplomatic or economic levers regional states could deploy together, such as occurred during the 1973 oil embargo? Of course, such united action requires most Middle Eastern states to put aside their differences in the interests of stabilizing the Levant and preventing further deaths. In the short term this appears highly improbable. In the long term, though, greater regional cooperation might be something leaders could consider to diminish instability. The scale of conflict seen in Lebanon and Gaza could prove a regular feature of the post-American Middle East, and regional leaders hoping to prevent this may need to explore methods of containing this among themselves. • Christopher Phillips is professor of international relations at Queen Mary University of London and author of “Battleground: Ten Conflicts that Explain the New Middle East.” X: @cjophillips