There’s much interest in the Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni’sdeal with Albania tooffshore asylum procedures, which started this week, in an attempt to tackle the rise of irregular migration. Germany, which has announced new border regulations after suspected Islamist attacks and the rise of far-right anti-immigration political parties, is particularly keen to see how the arrangement works. And during a visit to Rome last month the UK’s prime minister, Keir Starmer, praised Meloni’s efforts to reduce migration flows, saying his “government of pragmatism” sought new approaches to managing the issue. Last year, the number of irregular border crossings into the EU reached about 380,000. The union received 1.1m asylum applications, up by 17% compared with 2022 – a consistent upward trend over the past three years. This increase in irregular border crossings and asylum applications has reignited the debate about offshoring asylum procedures to third countries. But what is offshoring, and will it achieve its goal? This idea takes its cue from Australia’s controversial asylum policy in the early 00s – dubbed the “Pacific solution” – which sent asylum seekers to Nauru and Papua New Guinea for processing, and turned back boats from Australian waters. Last November, Meloni’s government signed a protocol with Albania to open two asylum centres in the neighbouring Balkan country. One centre at the port of Shëngjin will screen and register people rescued by Italian vessels on the high seas, and the second in Gjadër will process asylum claims of migrants coming from safe countries of origin in 28 days and detain those whose claims are rejected pending repatriation. Both centres opened on Monday after 16 men – 10 from Bangladesh and six from Egypt – were intercepted at sea by the Italian navy. Ahead of the offshoring scheme, Italy has controversially increased its list of safe countries that asylum seekers can be sent back to from 16 to 22 – including Egypt and Bangladesh, and many more with poor human rights records such as Tunisia and Nigeria. Offshoring is seen by many in the EU as a more humane alternative to dumping migrants in developing countries. The Italian state will remain responsible for examining asylum claims and resettling recognised refugees. Both centres are staffed by Italian personnel and will operate under Italian jurisdiction, while the role of Albania – the “third state” – is limited to renting out its territory and providing external security guards. Supporters of the model also believe it is more humane than the current EU practice of throwing millions of euros at north African countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, as well as Mauritania, to enhance their border controls to block migrants from reaching the EU. In Libya, EU-funded coastguards have been accused of brutality and people smuggling. But is offshore asylum processing really an effective and humane alternative to contain irregular migration? We have our doubts. Italy has committed to treating asylum seekers in Albania “as if” they were in Italy. However, it is doubtful whether this promise can be realised in practice. For instance, the protocol and its ratification law clarify that the authorities assessing applications would be located in Italy, and in-person meetings with lawyers in Albania would only be permitted if remote counselling proved impossible. This, combined with the challenges of maintaining oversight by civil society organisations, independent monitoring bodies, and parliamentary members in a third country, raises serious concerns about whether extra-EU processing can genuinely ensure fair treatment. Meloni has said that pregnant women, children and vulnerable people would not be transferred to Albania. But the UN high commissioner for refugees (UNHCR), whose body was not consulted prior to the Italy-Albania agreement, has voiced reservations – particularly when it comes to how to properly identify vulnerabilities and upholding the rights of asylum seekers. The UN has agreed to monitor the scheme for the first three months, without substantially clarifying how to overcome these critical issues. It remains to be seen if its presence will be sufficient to ensure that fundamental rights are upheld, or if instead it will indirectly legitimise the policy. The Italy-Albania deal is estimated to cost up to €985m over five years, diverting resources from critical domestic priorities such as healthcare, culture, and education. The centres in Albania can host around 1,000 migrants a month, with the possibility of increasing to 3,000. A small prison will host another 20 people. Given that about 157,000 migrants disembarked in Italy in 2023, is this costly strategy a viable answer to the challenges it seeks to address? The replicability of the Italy-Albania model at EU level is also questionable. Under EU law, asylum claims must be processed in the EU whenever asylum is asked for in the territory, at the border or in the territorial waters of a member state. Therefore, offshoring procedures in a third country can only be carried out if migrants are intercepted on the high seas or at land borders outside the EU, although even in that case some other aspects could make the policy incompatible with EU law. In Italy, for example, of the countries now on its safe list several aren’t deemed safe for certain categories of people, such as those who are LGBTQ+. This could potentially lead judicial authorities to halt applicants from these countries from being processed in Albania. In any case, for countries such as Germany, which do not face irregular border crossings from external frontiers, implementing such offshore schemes wouldbe unfeasible. It is true that alternative solutions to contrast the populist obsession with border controls are desperately needed. However, there are better and more humane options to counter border violence practices and “renterist” migration policies, which avoid reinforcing the trend of shifting responsibility towards third countries. Investing in measures that ensure effective access to asylum and provide dignified reception and integration within the EU would make a difference. The smooth and successful management of the Ukrainian humanitarian crisis demonstrated that the EU migration challenge is not a numeric issue. The EU has been able to host more than 4 million refugees from Ukraine when there is cohesive political will. Andreina De Leo is a PhD researcher at Maastricht University. Marco Gerbaudo is a PhD researcher at Bocconi University and a Blest fellow