US President Joe Biden tried to persuade Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to avoid a ground invasion of Gaza, allow humanitarian aid to flow to civilians, forgo an offensive in Rafah and more, but Israel proceeded anyway despite warnings from the leader of its closest ally. “Biden believed if he were to firmly and publicly break with Netanyahu, it would risk Israel’s security — something he was not prepared to do after Oct. 7,” writes legendary journalist Bob Woodward in his new book, “War.” Woodward’s book focuses on how the Biden administration has responded to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, plus some reporting about the withdrawal from Afghanistan and former President Donald Trump’s role since he left the White House. “War” takes statements from most officials at face value, providing a record of who said what, when and why. The book offers fascinating anecdotes about conversations between senior US officials and foreign leaders and diplomats and is a great record for readers who appreciate blow-by-blow accounts of political and diplomatic intrigue. However, it does not — and does not seek to — provide context about the war in Gaza or any sophisticated understanding of the Middle East. When it comes to the war in Gaza, Woodward’s narrative sounds like a constantly repeating record of Biden, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other senior officials demanding that Israel do more to protect and provide for civilians in Gaza. Biden and his team supported Israel’s right to militarily respond to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack and immediately increased supplies of US weapons to Tel Aviv. Despite disagreements with Netanyahu over the way the Israelis were carrying out military action, Biden flew to Israel and openly embraced him. As the war wore on, however, Biden’s team constantly warned Israeli leaders to act with more care and Israeli leaders continually ignored them. Biden often warns Netanyahu that he will act, but then does not follow through when Netanyahu predictably ignores him Kerry Boyd Anderson From early on in the war, Biden’s team pressed Israel to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza, while Israel’s government at first refused and then grudgingly allowed only small amounts that were often blocked by Israeli rules or lack of coordination to ensure safety for humanitarian workers. Biden insisted that Israel should not send its soldiers into Rafah without a viable plan to protect and provide for civilians, but Israel went ahead anyway. In some cases, Biden’s efforts contributed to some restraint, such as helping to persuade the Israeli government not to launch a major attack against Hezbollah a few days after Oct. 7. Biden’s team also helped to contain fighting between Israel and Iran. However, Biden’s attempts to persuade Israel to take a more careful approach in Gaza mostly failed. In the book, Biden often warns Netanyahu that he will take actions — including withholding offensive weapons deliveries — if the Israeli PM does not change course, but then does not follow through when Netanyahu predictably ignores him. Biden and his team sincerely wanted to ensure that civilians in Gaza received sufficient humanitarian aid, to convince Israel to significantly reduce civilian casualties and to avoid a broader regional war. Senior US officials saw protecting and assisting civilians as both a moral and strategic priority and frequently made that argument to Israeli leaders. Biden and his administration believed — at least initially — that they could use their influence with Israel to persuade it to minimize harm to civilians and perhaps make a start toward a two-state solution. The problem is that the Biden team failed to fully internalize the reality of the current Israeli government’s interests. In Woodward’s account, Blinken is often surprised by Israeli officials’ attitudes, including their early proposal to send Gaza civilians into Egypt, initial determination to submit the Strip to a total siege with no humanitarian provisions and general lack of concern about Palestinian civilians. As Israel continued to destroy Gaza and severely limit aid, Biden and his team became increasingly aggravated with Netanyahu — leading the president to eventually exclaim that Netanyahu is “a bad guy” and a “liar.” The problem is that the Biden team failed to fully internalize the reality of the current Israeli government’s interests Kerry Boyd Anderson Yet, throughout months of war in Gaza, Biden and his officials refused to truly accept the reality that the current Israeli government does not care about Palestinian civilians, utterly rejects the idea of a Palestinian state and sees the post-Oct. 7 period as an opportunity to push forward an agenda to annex the West Bank and destroy, once and for all, the idea of a sovereign Palestine. For Netanyahu and his government, the top priority is preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state and that priority shapes all other regional interests. Biden and his team appear unable or unwilling to recognize this reality and shape US policy accordingly. At best, they blame Netanyahu personally and fail to appreciate that he is hardly the only Israeli politician to share his goals. Woodward’s book briefly addresses how Trump might view the issue. Trump and many Republicans are better than Biden-style Democrats at recognizing that the Israeli government seeks permanent control over the Palestinian territories and accepts a very high cost to civilians. While Biden chooses to believe that he can work with Israel toward a more humanitarian approach and even peace, Trump’s team sees the Israeli government’s approach clearly — and sees no reason to object. Woodward generally takes a positive view of the Biden administration’s motives, but his account raises questions about its effectiveness in terms of the war in Gaza. The parts of the book that focus on the Middle East conflict highlight Biden’s good intentions, but also his lack of credible leverage with Israel. Kerry Boyd Anderson is a writer and political risk consultant with more than 18 years of experience as a professional analyst of international security issues and Middle East political and business risk. Her previous positions include deputy director for advisory with Oxford Analytica. X: @KBAresearch