Over the past decade, Libya has spiraled into a curious form of governance, aptly termed “dysfunctionism” — a state in which political gridlock, kleptocracy, and perpetual crisis have become not the symptoms of collapse, but the very framework of governance. This peculiar status quo has not only impeded progress, but has also entrenched a ruling elite that thrives on systemic inefficiency. The roots of Libya’s “dysfunctionism” lie in the political fractures that emerged post-2011, following the fall of Muammar Qaddafi. Competing for control, various factions have entrenched themselves within the central institutions of the country, with the Central Bank of Libya emerging as the latest battleground, much like the frictions at the National Oil Company, or the growing interest in wresting control of the Libyan Investment Authority. The bank’s dual role as both monetary policy setter and fiscal distributor has made it a coveted asset in the political tug-of-war, illustrating how critical state functions have been repurposed to sustain the power of ruling factions rather than serving the Libyan people. In essence, Libya’s political elite has managed the bizarre — i.e., the effective institutionalization of gridlock to the point where it has become a deliberate governance strategy. By maintaining control over the central bank and other pivotal resources, for instance, warring factions are now well placed to weaponize instability, holding Libya’s economy hostage as the standoff between the Tripoli-based government and eastern authorities continues to metastasize in a deliberate perpetuation of crisis. Each side’s refusals to concede are no longer mere administrative rows but calculated strategies to fuel a paralyzing status quo from which both derive significant benefits. Chaos and inefficiency have become the currency of power in Libya. The dysfunctional situation enables key actors to manipulate resources, secure loyalties, preserve patronage networks, and keep potential reformers at bay. For instance, the partial shutdown of oil production by eastern authorities, retaliating against the appointment of a new central bank governor by Tripoli, illustrates how economic sabotage is used to maintain leverage. The ensuing turmoil deters foreign investment, disrupts daily life, and keeps Libya tethered to external negotiations — a perfect breeding ground for corruption and rent-seeking. Libya’s predicament is a testament to how entrenched dysfunction can become a deliberate mode of governance. Provided the ruling elite benefit from this chronic instability, its members have little incentive to support genuine efforts for a stable, pluralistic society. The international community’s sporadic interventions, though well meaning, often get entangled in Libya’s internal contradictions, ultimately bolstering the dysfunction they aim to dismantle. Hence, “dysfunctionism” continues to define Libyan governance — an alarming example of how systemic crises can become the bedrock of political survival. Another striking example was an Aug. 5 decision to shut down Libya’s largest operational oil field by Saddam Haftar in a calculated move to “punish” Europe following his detention in Naples. This was no isolated incident but part of a larger trend where state resources have been transformed into currency for personal and political gain. Moreover, Libya’s political economy, fragmented by foreign influences and internal rivalries, is unsuitable even for its leaders, and incapable of constraining them, perennially unable — by design — to meet the needs of its citizens. The closure of oil fields, military flare-ups, institutional paralysis, and political standoffs are symptoms of a system engineered to permanently malfunction, reinforcing the power of a kleptocratic elite. The roots of the country’s ‘dysfunctionism’ lie in the political fractures that emerged after 2011. Hafed Al-Ghwell However, when the international community attempts to “restart” Libya’s broken system, it always ends in temporary fixes that never target nor address the underlying issues crippling it. This cyclical process of crisis and reset only perpetuates dysfunction. Clearly, Libya’s political deadlock is not just a consequence of endless internal power struggles; it is fueled by the international community’s short-sighted strategies and reluctance to engage deeply. By repeatedly endorsing quick fixes and temporary measures, global actors have played into the hands of Libya’s ruling elite, who exploit these interventions to maintain their grip on power. This “input-output” dysfunction ensures that while interim solutions are continuously proposed, the deeper structural reforms necessary for long-term stability remain unaddressed. Access to Libya’s vast oil revenues remains the foremost prize in this standoff, worsened by the international community’s failure to enforce stringent economic measures or foster comprehensive political dialogue. The Central Bank of Libya, the repository of tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue, has also become a focal point in this same struggle. Yet, international financial institutions still failed to impose firm penalties on the Libyan factions for their manipulative use of these resources, allowing the ruling elite to divert funds at will, reinforce their power bases and grease palms, all while the general population suffers from chronic instability. However, foreign governments remain wary of their own economic and strategic interests — often avoiding taking decisive action that would disrupt their transactions with Libya, ultimately bolstering a kleptocratic cabal that is all too thrilled when potential intervening actors look the other way. A collective reluctance to impose asset freezes or more stringent financial controls out of fear of losing access to Libya’s oil and markets only deepens an existing divide. Meanwhile, instead of driving progressive change, the UN’s involvement has — at times — magnified the dysfunction. For instance, the UN-backed preliminary deal to appoint a new central bank governor demonstrates how international mediation often becomes a pawn in the local power game. Although the agreement aimed at resolving fiscal disputes, the competing factions manipulated the process to gain a stronger foothold, thus perpetuating the status quo. This illustrates how international actors, despite their well-meaning attempts, have facilitated a system where state capture and political inertia thrive. Libya’s version of “dysfunctionism” goes beyond mere inefficiency — it is a self-propagating governance model that systematically blocks any meaningful reform. As state institutions crumble and moribund laws are manipulated, armed militias and a disengaged international community keep public outrage at bay. This absence of accountability solidifies the ruling elite’s hold over the country which is characterized by cyclical crises without resolution. It is imperative to recognize that until this system is uprooted, Libya will remain trapped in a cycle of collapse and pseudo-reconstruction, staving off democratic transition and entrenching corrupt rule. This country, on the brink of a democratic miracle a decade ago, has seen that vision swallowed by “dysfunctionism” — a grim testament to the intractability of entrenched power. • Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. X: @HafedAlGhwell