In 2016, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan referred to Russian President Vladimir Putin as an “occupier” in Syria. This statement came at a time when Turkish-Russian relations were extremely tense after Turkish forces shot down a Russian jet that briefly violated its airspace in 2015. The situation worsened as Russia deepened its military involvement in Syria. However, by the end of 2016, the two countries unexpectedly began to repair their relationship after seven months of harsh rhetoric and sanctions. It is important to recognize that a combination of domestic and international factors played a key role in this reconciliation. International factors, in particular, play a crucial role in shaping how states perceive and interact with one another. This is especially evident in the changing rhetoric from Russia since the reelection of Donald Trump as US president. Just last week, for example, an interesting statement came from the Kremlin. Russian Special Envoy to Syria Alexander Lavrentiev reportedly referred to Turkiye as an “occupying force” — a term I do not recall ever being used by Russian officials to describe Turkiye’s presence in Syria. While Russian policymakers have, at certain phases of the Syrian crisis, expressed discontent with Turkiye’s actions or military operations in the country, they have also at times tacitly supported some of Ankara’s moves. Notably, it was the Astana peace framework that enabled Turkiye and Russia to draw their limits in Syria and shape their policies within these limits to avoid a serious confrontation that may escalate the tone of dialogue between them. So, why has a Russian official, particularly one engaged with the Syrian dossier, adopted such a tone toward Turkiye? Two factors come to mind: the US election and the ongoing war in Ukraine. The US election appears to have sparked some hopes in Ankara and concerns in Russia. The latter may regard any positive momentum between Ankara and Washington as being at its expense in Syria. Through these recent statements, Russia may be signaling a message to Ankara, which is already preparing for the Trump 2.0 era. Ankara expects Trump, once back in the White House, to fulfill his promises of removing American troops from northern Syria, where Washington is allied with PKK/YPG forces — largely Kurdish groups that Ankara considers to be terrorist organizations. Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler has already stated that he expects the US to pull its troops out of Syria under Trump’s upcoming administration. Russia may regard any positive momentum between Ankara and Washington as being at its expense in Syria Sinem Cengiz The hope that the new US administration might take a step in this regard became stronger after Trump’s political ally Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who is expected to play a major role in his government, stated that Trump wants to pull American troops out of northern Syria, instead of leaving them as “cannon fodder” if fighting breaks out between other parties. This statement was warmly received by Turkish policymakers, who have long wanted such a thing to happen. Despite the changes in administrations since 2014, no US president has changed the country’s policy of supporting the Kurdish forces in their fight against Daesh. While the US-YPG alliance became the main issue of contention with Turkiye, it also paved the way for closer Ankara-Moscow relations. Syrian-centric cooperation between Turkiye and Russia became so unique that, although the two states have sharply opposed objectives in the war-torn country, they established a sort of cooperation that has, at times, worked even better than any American-Turkish cooperation in Syria. Thus, no issue has shaped Turkish-Russian relations in recent years as much as the crisis in Syria, not even the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, Ankara’s approach toward the Ukraine war could have implications for Russia’s perception of Turkiye’s role in Syria. I think this way because the term “occupier,” used by a Russian official to describe Turkiye in Syria, emerged in the wake of Moscow this week rejecting a peace proposal for Ukraine put forward by Erdogan. The Kremlin called Erdogan’s plan, which reportedly included freezing the current front lines, supplying Ukraine with weapons and deploying international troops to a demilitarized buffer zone in the eastern part of the country, “unacceptable.” This proposal came while NATO countries are preparing for a second term in the White House for Trump, who has vowed to end the war in Ukraine. It appears that Turkiye aims to position itself as a key and influential player in the Ukraine file, particularly when Trump returns to power and he begins shaping his approach to the war. Ankara’s approach toward the Ukraine war could have implications for Russia’s perception of Turkiye’s role in Syria Sinem Cengiz Turkiye’s position in the Ukraine war is clear: it supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity, but it also opposes Western sanctions on Moscow. However, despite this clarity, Russia has sought to challenge Ankara’s stance, particularly regarding its military support for Kyiv. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said he is “surprised” that Turkiye is continuing to supply weapons to Ukraine while offering to act as mediator in the conflict. These statements from the Kremlin suggest that, for Russia, Turkiye’s policies in Ukraine and Syria are increasingly intertwined and Moscow perceives Ankara’s actions in both cases as interconnected. It appears that the US is looking for a way out of Syria, while Turkiye is seeking to bring Washington on board in a way that can safeguard its interests. However, given the uncertainties over any shift in US policy in Syria, Turkiye must also carefully manage its relationship with Russia to protect the partnership it has developed there. For Ankara, the worst-case scenario would be the continuation of US support for Kurdish groups combined with potential tacit Russian support for them, as it offered during periods of tension between Moscow and Ankara in Syria. • Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye’s relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz