If anyone required any further evidence of the volatility of the situation between Israel and Hamas-controlled Gaza, they need look no further than the events of the last few days. Despite intensive, though indirect, negotiations to bring a long-term truce along the Israeli-Gaza border, hostilities flared up, causing casualties on both sides. Unless both sides come to their senses, this might still escalate into a full-blown war. Both sides have experienced this before, most recently in 2014, and neither came anywhere close to achieving their aims, while both were badly bruised. The situation between Israel and Gaza is in a permanent state of calamity waiting to happen, although the fatalistic view — that another round of bloodshed between the two is inevitable — is plainly untrue. And it seems that, for now, the threat of further escalation has been averted by the two sides agreeing to a cease-fire that emulates the one they reached in 2014. The real tragedy of the situation is that neither side has an interest in another prolonged and damaging war, but they might still end up with one due to the internal dynamics of both sets of decision-makers, and the nature of the relationship between the two political entities. In the absence of a consensus within the Israeli government regarding the country’s future relations with Gaza, especially under a Hamas government, the pendulum has been swinging for years between either: Attempts to bring down the Hamas government, either by military force or by pressuring the Gazan population; or moves toward coexistence, which would establish a truce in return for removing much of the Israeli blockade. During his visit to Paris for the commemoration of the end of the First World War, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu provided an insight into his view of the fragile relations with Hamas in Gaza, admitting, unlike some of his Cabinet colleagues, that a war in Gaza would be senseless. However, in the same breath he argued that: “There is no diplomatic solution for Gaza, just as there is no diplomatic solution for (Daesh).” The comparison of Hamas with Daesh is where Netanyahu is at his demagogic worst but, at the same time, his approach is one of first seeking a lowering of tensions along the border, followed by a long-term truce: The best that one can expect of his government. But this all came with the caveat that the Israeli prime minister is not afraid of war if necessary. Similarly, Hamas is sending mixed messages. On the one hand it is negotiating an Egyptian/UN-brokered long-term truce with Israel, and on the other its ferocious and wide-ranging response to what looks like a botched operation by Israel’s special forces in Khan Yunis, deep in the Gaza Strip, has caught Israel by surprise and runs the risk of much wider hostilities. As in the past, the excessive use of force, when actually restraint should have been the order of the day, is feeding the vicious cycle of violence, and consequently delaying even further the need for relieving the humanitarian crisis in the entire Gaza Strip Yossi Mekelberg In the customary tit-for-tat between the two protagonists after the initial Israeli operation, in which a senior Israeli officer and seven Palestinians were killed, both sides embarked on a show of military force. However, the Hamas leadership must have known that their retaliation by way of a barrage of about 400 rockets on southern Israeli towns and villages and the firing of an anti-tank missile at an Israeli bus would only lead to a fierce response. This response was, of course, almost instant, with Israel’s air force striking at more than 100 Hamas and Islamic Jihad targets. Neither side’s behavior is consistent with their strategic aim of reaching a sustainable truce. Part of the answer to the contradictory nature of the behavior of both sides in this conflict is that they have become victims of their own inertia; of the need to respond with excessive force even when their own objectives demand a more measured approach. To a certain extent it is an attempt to demonstrate to the other side that their engagement in efforts to bring calm along the border is not from a position of weakness, and that they have enough ammunition at their disposal to inflict pain on the other side and deter it. While the military power of Israel is all too evident, for Hamas its actions are both a show of strength to demonstrate that years of blockade haven’t reduced their capability to militarily hurt Israel, as well as being part of the domestic political conversation with those who oppose any reconciliatory overtures toward Israel. On the Palestinian side, there is a demand to maintain the marches along the fence and also to maintain the armed struggle. On the Israeli side, the pressure from the right is mounting for a military operation that will bring down Hamas, or at least put severe pressure on it and cripple its military capability. As in the past, the excessive use of force, when actually restraint should have been the order of the day, is feeding the vicious cycle of violence, and consequently delaying even further the need for relieving the humanitarian crisis in the entire Gaza Strip. Attempts to bring about a truce and accept foreign aid, including the recent shipment from Qatar, derive from an acceptance by Netanyahu of what most of the security establishment in Israel, past and present, has been advising. That is, without lifting restrictions on movement and thus allowing economic activity within this tiny piece of land with its population of 2 million people, of whom 1.6 million rely on foreign aid, conflict is just a matter of when and on what scale, not if. Levels of unemployment and poverty, lack of adequate access to clean water and sanitation, and an electricity supply for only part of the day all add to the sense of suffocation felt by those who live in the Gaza Strip, and also has an adverse impact on Israel’s security. It creates cadres of angry, mainly young, people who are ready to confront Israel. So, before the situation gets even further out of control, the international community must exert pressure on both sides to avert an escalation of the current situation and return to negotiating on a genuine truce and the reconstruction of Gaza. This would serve as an important stepping stone, not only to Israel’s improved relations with Gaza, but also with the Palestinians as a whole. Yossi Mekelberg is professor of international relations at Regent’s University London, where he is head of the International Relations and Social Sciences Program. He is also an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. He is a regular contributor to the international written and electronic media. Twitter: @YMekelberg Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News" point-of-view