Pandemics, endless wars, and geopolitical showdowns have come to define this year and will continue to shape global relations over the next decade. For Europe, a crisis is intensifying in the eastern Mediterranean, where conflicting interpretations of maritime law and historical antagonism are threatening to fray relations between two NATO allies — Greece and Turkey. The standoff could intensify geopolitical rivalries, a dangerous proposition in a world increasingly accustomed to proxy battles waged by far-off powers to pursue or safeguard their interests. The conflict in Libya and rising tensions between Turkey and its Gulf rivals are now directly intersecting with unresolved disputes over territory, compounded by recent discoveries of gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean. It is reminiscent of China’s mad scramble to demarcate a maritime territory that extends as far as 2,000km from mainland China to encompass some of the oil and gas rich waters off the coasts of Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines, according to what Beijing calls “historical maritime rights.” Greece has not been shy in declaring its willingness to escalate diplomatic tension into armed conflict, to deter Turkish attempts to encroach on what Athens considers Greek waters. The Turkish government recently granted its state petroleum company a license to conduct oil and gas exploration in 24 locations in the eastern Mediterranean, seven of them just off the coast of large Greek islands such as Rhodes and Crete. No time frame was given for when such exploration will take place, leading some to believe that it is merely Turkish provocation, since neither side wants to risk conflict in one of the world’s busiest waterways accounting for 15 percent of global shipping. At the heart of east Mediterranean tensions is Cyprus. Since 1974, a frozen conflict has thwarted any attempts at diplomacy and establishing amicable relations between bitter and mistrustful Greek and Turkish communities after Turkish troops invaded the island to prevent a Greek Cypriot coup seeking union with Greece. About 35,000 Turkish troops remain stationed in the Turkish Cypriot north in a tense standoff largely devoid of violence. However, recent discoveries of massive gas reserves off the Cypriot coast injected fresh optimism of a lasting settlement and a possible reunification of Cyprus. These developments came at a time when regional players were seeking to leverage common interests concerning eastern Mediterranean"s gas reserves, leading to the formation last year — with Washington"s backing — of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), comprising Cyprus, Israel, Greece, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Italy. Turkey was noticeably absent. The EMGF has since expanded its ambitions from gas exploration and exports to joint military drills off the Cypriot coast, as well as cooperating on regional security, becoming a de facto anti-Turkey geopolitical coalition. The group"s activities have also gained interest and attention from the UAE, itself locked in a regional rivalry with Ankara with fault lines evident in Libya"s civil war, where they provide military aid to opposing factions. For Europe, a crisis is intensifying in the eastern Mediterranean, where conflicting interpretations of maritime law and historical antagonism are threatening to fray relations between two NATO allies — Greece and Turkey. Hafed Al-Ghwell For the rest of the EMGF, tensions came to a head late last year when Turkey signed a deal with Libya’s UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli establishing an exclusive economic zone via a partnership agreement on a maritime boundary that encroaches on Greek and Cypriot interests. In addition, the deal will allow Ankara to preclude a proposed gas pipeline that would supply Israeli, Egyptian and Cypriot natural gas to European markets. Ankara also gains licenses to explore and drill for oil and gas off the Libyan coast. In response, Cyprus and Greece have joined France and the UAE in supporting the embattled eastern military leader Khalifa Haftar against the internationally recognized GNA in Libya. Worryingly, both sides are using Syrian mercenaries, which draws two intense geopolitical proxy struggles closer together, much to the benefit of Russia’s designs for the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the emergence and swift expansion of the EMGF has vindicated Turkish fears of being under siege by hostile neighbors and the only way forward is escalation because there simply is no room to maneuver. Conceding to Greece would probably be taken as Ankara backing down on other long-standing maritime disputes, particularly in the Aegean Sea. Turkey has also failed to find natural gas reserves in its own waters so the next best alternative — given mounting economic woes — is aiming for any rights claimed by Turkish Cypriots. However, that will be a challenging endeavor given that Ankara is not a signatory of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Europe"s adopted model for the allocation of maritime rights. Any sort of deal that Cyprus may propose will probably be rejected by Turkey and vice versa. Additionally, any failure to counter the EMGF"s growing influence will challenge Turkey"s regional position, especially if the group continues to align its economic, political and security interests with those of the UAE. So far, the Turkish response has been to increase military support to the GNA in Libya to thwart UAE designs there, along with leveraging its position as a principal backer to forge the exclusive economic zone agreement. Ankara has also stepped up expeditions to gas fields claimed by Cyprus and chased off any Cypriot research vessels from the area. Neither side is prepared to back down but if the ultimate destination of eastern Mediterranean gas is Europe, then Brussels has significantly more influence to broker a lasting settlement for both sides before the situation worsens. Unfortunately, EU-Turkey relations are a head-scratcher, particularly in regards to Cyprus and NATO. Turkey is a member of NATO but not the EU, and Ankara does not recognize the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus, complicating EU relations with NATO. After all, the Republic of Cyprus is a member of the EU but not NATO, does not recognize the Turkish Cypriot north (only Turkey does) and blocks NATO-EU engagement from its seat in Brussels. The result is Brussels opting for a soft containment of Turkey via sanctions in February at the behest of Cyprus, France, Greece and Italy targeting Ankara"s predatory offshore drilling. Unfortunately, a follow-up declaration by EMGF has only irked Ankara, risking further escalation and threatening European interests in regards to immigration and terrorism. It is crucial that the EU leverage its position as the final destination of eastern Mediterranean gas by withdrawing its exclusionary policy in favor of a constructive engagement that can better serve Brussels’ migration, energy and Middle East policies — all of which feature Mediterranean relations at its core. It is a lot easier to deal with issues relating to gas exploration and divvying up wealth from exporting hydrocarbons than it is resolving political issues such as reunification or settling the puzzling dilemmas of maritime laws. The EU can build on that without formally recognizing Turkish Cypriot north or even trying to legitimize the Turkish military presence on the island. There is little chance the EMGF will accept Turkey"s membership given acrimonious relations with Israel and Egypt worsened by growing UAE influence and developments in Libya, so there is little sense in urging the EU to push for it. Instead, Europe should re-examine its strategy and response to the Libyan conflict by not only pressuring Turkey to negotiate but incentivizing it to do so. A balanced response that equally admonishes Haftar’s backers and pressures them to commit to a cease-fire in favor of meaningful dialogue will go a long way to divorce Ankara from the belief that its neighbors are actively seeking to shut it out of the recently discovered Mediterranean wealth. If Europe does not step up on this, it risks leaving a vacuum that other players are all too happy to fill, especially Russia, which will actively seek to sabotage any EMGF plans to export Mediterranean gas to the EU to protect its own monopoly. Hafed Al-Ghwell is a non-resident senior fellow with the Foreign Policy Institute at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He is also senior adviser at the international economic consultancy Maxwell Stamp and at the geopolitical risk advisory firm Oxford Analytica, a member of the Strategic Advisory Solutions International Group in Washington DC and a former adviser to the board of the World Bank Group. Twitter: @HafedAlGhwell