Negotiations between Israel and Lebanon over the demarcation of their maritime border have been suspended after four rounds of talks mediated by the US. A fifth round hasn’t been scheduled, but the fundamental need to resolve this maritime dispute is significant for avoiding another issue of friction around the exploration and production of gas reserves in this part of the eastern Mediterranean. Considering the history between these two countries, leaving this dispute unresolved could lead to a confrontation, and with it drag in other regional actors including Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. Alternatively, a successful conclusion of the Israel–Lebanon negotiations may defuse other areas of contention between the two, although the volatility of both countries’ political systems —Lebanon’s more than Israel’s — leaves a narrow window of opportunity to go beyond simply addressing the maritime border. When talks between Israel and Lebanon — two countries still officially at war — began more than two months ago the general mood was one of optimism. The very fact that they agreed to direct talks under UN auspices in the Lebanese border town of Naqoura signalled their commitment to reach an agreement and avoid another potential flashpoint. It took at least three years of intensive behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts to bring the two sides to the table, thanks to a framework agreement that successfully isolated the maritime dispute from Beirut’s demand to include at least a dozen land border disputes, including some places of concern to Syria too, which would have complicated things further. Such trilateral negotiations, for obvious reasons, are not possible for the foreseeable future. For now, the sides have parked the land border dispute, and to avoid Lebanon losing face, US Assistant Secretary of State David Schenker, who led the mediation efforts, remarked that the US would welcome expert-level discussions on demarcating the Blue Line between Israel and Lebanon, with the aim of resolving that problem, but it was agreed that this was a separate issue. Concentrating on the maritime border should have made reaching an agreement easier. However, in four rounds of talks it became apparent that there is no easy solution. To begin with, both sides are basing their arguments on contrasting maps that are almost impossible to reconcile, so unless there is the political will and ability to find a constructive resolution that serves both sides, there will be no agreement. Moreover, the urgency of finding a solution is not the same for both sides, because when it comes to natural gas production they are at very different stages of development. Israel is already extracting natural gas from vast offshore fields, while Lebanon is strapped for cash, and faces the worst economic crisis since the end of its civil war 30 years ago. Its desperate need for new sources of revenue was exacerbated by the Aug. 4 explosion in the port of Beirut and its devastating consequences. The magnitude of the disaster and its implications for the Lebanese economy has swayed even Israel’s Lebanese arch enemy, Hezbollah, to remove its objection to direct talks between the two. Considering the history between Israel and Lebanon, leaving this dispute unresolved could lead to a confrontation, and with it drag in other regional actors including Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. Yossi Mekelberg For now the talks have been concentrating on a specific issue, one whose roots date, as do scores of other explosive territorial disagreements in the region, from the colonial legacy of the UK and France and their “vision” of the region articulated by the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. In their negotiations, Sir Mark Sykes, a British military man, politician and diplomatic adviser, and the French diplomat François Picot, drew what would eventually become the Blue Line, which is consistent with the border imposed by the 1923 Anglo-French accord. The border was drawn to serve the strategic interests of the British and French mandates, but left a tragic legacy of border disputes long after the colonial powers had quit the region. In the Mediterranean, the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon revolve around 850 square kilometers of a triangular shaped area with natural gas-rich fields, which forms part of Israel’s overall geoeconomic strategy of developing such fields and supplying Europe with natural gas through a planned pipeline across the Mediterranean. There is no obvious way to demarcate the maritime border. Both sides hold to what they believe, or would like to believe, is the answer. A century after the line was drawn, it is unclear whether the place where the border was marked on the shoreline is the correct one, which is causing disagreement over the angle at which the line should be drawn in the sea, and shifting the solution from geography to politics. At the end of the day, it is not going to be the accuracy of the maps or finding the “true” line where the maritime border should extend, but political will, and whether the interests of the two countries with their complex and inflexible domestic politics can find a meeting point. Lebanese officials are at pains to underline that these negotiations are unrelated to the normalization agreements Israel has signed with other countries in the region, though the centrality of the US in facilitating the talks suggests otherwise. Lebanon may on this occasion be found to protest too much. For the Lebanese political system, especially Hezbollah, consenting to direct talks with its neighbor suggests caution in its dealings with Washington, an understanding of the importance the US attaches to oil and gas issues in the eastern Mediterranean, and not only the economic but also the geostrategic implications of conflicts in which some of the US closest allies are embroiled. The suspension of the talks may have been the result of creating a deliberate mini crisis over a temporary sticking point. It may also reflect a wish to wait until the new Biden administration has settled in, and then assess which way the wind is blowing in its policies toward the region, and specifically regarding this maritime dispute. This may determine whether a fifth and successful round of talks will take place, and also whether other areas of contention between Israel and Lebanon could be negotiated. Yossi Mekelberg is professor of international relations at Regent’s University London, where he is head of the International Relations and Social Sciences Program. He is also an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. He is a regular contributor to the international written and electronic media. Twitter: @YMekelberg Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News" point-of-view