Next week, world leaders will once again gather at a global climate summit to rehash unmet commitments and pledge non-specific actions, while simultaneously resisting efforts to ensure the writ and spirit of the planned proceedings in Sharm El-Sheikh are binding, let alone enforceable. Even now, in its 27th iteration and the fifth to be held on African soil, the UN Climate Change Conference, COP27, is unlikely to materially shift the planet away from its current trajectory toward severe disruption, even if it manages to shake off the “constructive ambiguity” of the previous year’s gathering in Glasgow, Scotland. Nonetheless, in our increasingly fragmented, multipolar world, such opportunities for continued cooperation and collaboration are welcome and should, rightly, be celebrated. After all, just last year, more than 150 countries managed to put forward plans to decarbonize their economies. And in May this year, the G7 countries signed a commitment to predominantly decarbonize their electricity sectors by 2035. It capped off a string of highly-touted promises to reduce coal use, end commodity-based deforestation, cut methane emissions by a third, and double the financial support for mitigation and adaptation efforts across the developing world. However, there is still a 42 percent probability that average global temperatures will rise by more than the target of 1.5 C above preindustrial levels. This is not helped by the fact that last year alone, carbon emissions totaled more than 36 billion tons, a 6 percent increase attributable to desperate attempts at recovery in many nations as the pandemic eased. Failure to come up with constructive and meaningful agreements at COP26 last year have also dampened public enthusiasm and fueled a perception that this and future climate summits are unlikely to inspire much-needed global action. For instance, Egypt, the host nation of this year’s gathering, has yet to declare its own emissions targets and its climate plans are deemed highly insufficient by experts. The war raging in Ukraine has complicated global climate goals and inflamed international tensions that will likely hamper the deeper levels of cooperation needed to turn ambitions into concrete, enforceable action plans that will hold the world’s biggest emitters accountable. Meanwhile, across the Arab world the debilitating effects of unmitigated climate change are only becoming more apparent, more severe and more frequent, in some cases compounding the negative effects of conflict, displacement, social inequalities and political instability. Droughts, wildfires, record heat waves, floods and dust storms continue to pummel the region’s interiors and shores, worsening food and water insecurity, and introducing new socioeconomic and political headaches that could ultimately upend already complicated prevailing dynamics on the front lines of the climate change battle. In addition, a troubled geopolitical landscape, pandemic-battered economies saddled with increasingly expensive debt, food and energy inflation, rampant unemployment, and capital flight as a result of a strong US dollar are all factors that can sideline climate priorities, energy transitions and critical transformations as nations instead focus on fossil fuel-powered recoveries. Indeed, the next two COP events are in the Middle East and North Africa region (following Egypt, the UAE will host in 2023), which presents a rare opportunity to center the discussions around the priorities and informed perspectives in the region that is most affected by climate change. The urgency of the moment is not lost on the societies and governments of the region, nor are the potential, well-documented upsides to well-timed, adequately financed and proficiently executed interventions. However, the pathways to net-zero emissions, clean energy and sustainable transformations are uncertain and highly variable across Arab countries. This means top-down solutions will undermine more effective, realistic and context-specific transformations, leaving already struggling societies and peoples worse off. If COP27 and COP28 are to have as much of an impact as COP 26 in Glasgow, if not a greater one, they must not become mere avenues for climate-diplomacy ambiguities or high-toned occasions for simply kicking the can further down the road. It must be emphasized that if clean, renewable energy and the underlying technologies and innovations behind it are made foundational to whole-of-society transformations that precipitate effective mitigation and adaptation strategies, it is very possible, even probable, for most of the Arab world to simultaneously achieve both its climate and development goals. The region’s sun-rich deserts and massive hydrocarbon endowments (for the production and export of blue hydrogen), for example, mean clean energy-focused interventions are already technically and economically feasible. In addition, they come with innumerable benefits, including job creation, sustainable growth and resilience, as well as a reduction in adverse health and environmental effects. Next, there must be greater acknowledgment of the uncertainties and differences in the pathways for most Arab countries to meet their commitments while also attempting to unlock opportunities for development, growth, economic sophistication and enhanced competitiveness during the transition to a post-oil world. Given the intensifying economic headwinds hampering post-pandemic recoveries and the equally urgent need to accelerate climate change interventions or transformations that are already behind schedule, the question now is whether Arab countries should change to recover or recover to change? For oil-importing nations, the answer is relatively simple: Recover to change, first to recoup losses resulting from the pandemic and then to strengthen economies ahead of painful, politically costly transformations, especially absent generous external financial support that would most definitely come with strings attached. No matter how ambitious the pledges might be, countries will not be able to afford to subordinate urgent priorities to take on the mass-scale technological, economic, financial and social risks and uncertainties that come with lurching toward externally-mandated, top-down green transformations. Besides, there has been little reassurance from the international community so far because, despite pledging up to $100 billion annually for climate change mitigation and adaptation across the developing world, much of that commitment remains severely underfunded. And continued inaction will only make climate-focused shifts across the global South much more costly as climate change-related humanitarian crises intensify. As a result, to easily underwrite these recoveries ahead of urgent transformations, less-wealthy nations will just keep burning more fossil fuels in the short-to-medium term, creating incentives for oil exporters to slow down their own expensive transformations so that they can reap the financial windfall from uninterrupted hydrocarbon exports. This way, wealthier, oil-exporting countries in the region can reduce the effects on public finances, sociopolitical dynamics and their economies as they take their time to pursue climate-focused interventions. Either way, most countries will ultimately end up missing their own targets and failing to meet commitments, and the planet will fail to achieve its 1.5-2 C target, with disastrous consequences for all. After all, there is ample evidence from the planet’s paleoclimate records that shows an increase in global temperature of just 1.5-2 C above preindustrial-era averages will result in a sea level rise of 6 to 9 meters in the coming decades. To put these figures in perspective, a 5 meter rise in sea level would wipe out 13 percent of Qatar’s land mass. Even just a 3 meter rise could reduce Egypt’s gross domestic product by 12 percent. Merely insisting first on rough-shod transformations for all nations, in the search for nebulous ideals or simply to cross off items on a climate change checklist, will be detrimental to the efforts to achieve long-term goals, especially in a region that contains five of the 10 countries most vulnerable to climate change, including Iraq, Morocco and Egypt. By ignoring country-specific concerns, only a chaotic future awaits us, even if world leaders reaffirm their commitments to stand up for the planet we live on with the necessary urgency to preempt the projected rises in global temperatures by the end of the century. Hafed Al-Ghwell is a Senior Fellow and Executive Director of the Ibn Khaldun Strategic Initiative (IKSI) at the Foreign Policy Institute (FPI) of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington DC and the former Advisor to the Dean of the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank Group. Twitter: @HafedAlGhwell