The US midterm election results took everyone by surprise. With a “red wave” widely expected, the Democrats outperformed expectations. In American domestic politics, this has many meanings. To start, with the investigation into the Biden family — namely the president’s son Hunter’s business dealings — will probably be toned down. First-time presidents usually lose seats in their first midterms. Barack Obama lost 63 seats in the House of Representatives in 2010 and Bill Clinton lost 52 in 1994. Donald Trump lost 40 seats in 2018. So, Joe Biden did quite well relative to former presidents. This will probably give the president, who turns 80 next week, an incentive to run again. But what will the election results mean for the Middle East? On several issues, the midterm elections are significant to the region. As the Democrats did fairly well, they will probably double down on their foreign policy. Biden, who many had doubted due to his old age, will be emboldened. While the Republicans have a pragmatic attitude toward Saudi Arabia, the Democrats follow a populist line. This was especially clear with Biden, who took a belligerent attitude toward both the Kingdom and Turkiye, two important US allies, while campaigning to be president. He claimed he would help opponents of Recep Tayyip Erdogan bring down the Turkish president and he promised to make Riyadh a “pariah.” Despite the fact that such statements hurt the US national interest, this pseudo-liberal speech pretending to safeguard “democratic principles” around the world sells well among the US electorate, especially Democrats. However, Biden had to change his position on Saudi Arabia once the war in Ukraine erupted and countries in the West decided they needed an alternative to Russian gas. In October, the Kingdom, as part of the OPEC+ group, decided to pursue its interests and cut oil production. This was an embarrassment for the American president, who had hoped that his visit to Saudi Arabia would make the country’s leadership more supportive of the American position. Biden said he would make Saudi Arabia pay the price for what the White House considered to be a helping hand for Russia, claiming that the cut would “increase Russian revenues and blunt the effectiveness of sanctions.” Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia did not seem disturbed by the American administration’s belligerent position. However, now that the Democrats have been emboldened by their relatively good midterms performance, they will probably maintain their combative position on the Kingdom. He will try to pressure traditional US allies like Turkiye and Saudi Arabia to take a more confrontational attitude toward Russia. Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib On the other hand, some believe that the Middle East is not a key interest for the Biden administration and it will instead focus more on Russia and China. According to Princeton University professor Bernard Haykel: “If Biden can’t do anything on the domestic front, he will focus on foreign policy in his last two years. This means focusing on Russia and China. The Middle East will not be on his radar at all.” With the Republicans set to win control of the House, Biden’s hands will likely be tied in terms of domestic policy. Hence he will try to prove himself in foreign policy. So, the chances are that he will try to pressure traditional US allies like Turkiye and Saudi Arabia to take a more confrontational attitude toward Russia — something both states have refrained from doing so far. However, this pressure on both countries will push them closer to each other as they seek to preserve their autonomy. Turkiye was vocal in supporting the decision to cut oil production, with Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu accusing the US of “bullying” the Kingdom. It is unlikely that, by pure pressure, the Biden administration will make Turkiye or Saudi Arabia toe the line. If the US wants more support from these two countries, it will have to take into consideration their security needs. Turkiye considers the American support of the Kurdish YPG in Syria to be a security risk, while Saudi Arabia is disturbed by Washington’s hands-off approach regarding the Iranian threat. Meanwhile, the Democrats might have a firmer attitude toward Israel, whose electorate has voted for what comes across as the most right-wing government ever. Biden, who used democracy as a main talking point in his presidential campaign, is unlikely to humor the upcoming Israeli government, which will be vehemently anti-Arab and pro-settlements. On Iran, Biden, like his Democrat predecessor, will probably not give more than a pep talk to the Iranian protesters. In 2009, Obama expressed support for protests in the country, but this narrative did not match the passive policy he enacted. He was cautious not to break the lines of communication with Iran. Similarly, Biden — despite his claim that he wishes to “free Iran” — is unlikely to try and steer events toward bringing about the regime’s demise. On Syria, while the Republicans are in favor of increasing the pressure on the Assad regime through sanctions, the current administration adopts a policy that is more like kicking the can down the road. The Republicans will probably push for a new sanctions package in the House. With the Senate remaining under the Democrats’ control, any push for more sanctions on the Assad regime will depend on Bob Menendez, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As Haykel said, the Middle East is a low priority on Biden’s agenda. Hence, beyond the harsh narrative toward Saudi Arabia and sweet talk to the Iranian protesters, it is unlikely the Biden administration will take any serious policies to steer the course of events in the region. However, this would be a mistake, as the region is boiling and any unforeseen disruption might have catastrophic repercussions if it is unaccounted for. Biden’s track record from the last two years shows that he reacts as minimally as he can to events in the region, let alone having the drive to change them. This trend will probably continue for the next two years. • Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib is a specialist in US-Arab relations with a focus on lobbying. She is an affiliated scholar at the Hoover Institution, Stanford.